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ABSTRACT 
There are two motivations for studying Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations.  First, the 
Marine Corps will be a first-responder in the future.  
Second, logistics support takes on a primary role.  This 
thesis identifies the potential for using agent-based 
models to support logistical decision-making in an urban, 
HA/DR environment.  We develop a simulation using Map Aware 
Non-uniform Automata (MANA).  Our scenario depicts a relief 
convoy with security attachment, operating on urban 
terrain.  The convoy moves to an HA/DR site where they 
distribute food to neutrals (locals) who have made their 
way to that site. 
We couple data farming with a Latin Hypercube 
experimental design to explore very large data space.  
Forty variables are identified.  We establish 640 different 
design settings and each setting is replicated 50 times 
producing a 32,000-point dataset.  We use regression to fit 
several models.  The conclusions from this thesis suggest: 
coupling intelligent designs with data farming is effective 
at exploring large data space; mission success in HA/DR 
operations may depend on only a handful of factors; 
understanding local communications is the key to mission 
success; success cannot be determined based solely on the 



































The reader is cautioned the computer programs 
developed in this research may not have been exercised for 
all cases of interest.  While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are 
free of computational and logic errors, they cannot be 
considered validated.  Any application of these programs 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There are two main motivations that have driven the 
author to actively study Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster 
Relief (HA/DR) operations.  The first is the compelling 
fact that the Marine Corps will be called on as a first-
responder to humanitarian crises in the future.  The second 
is that, in HA/DR operations, logistics support takes on a 
primary role.  Because the Marine Corps operates in a 
forward-deployed status, it is uniquely positioned and 
equipped to rapidly respond to pleas for help.  Afloat 
units deploy with a full compliment of equipment, allowing 
them to provide immediate life-saving services and then, if 
necessary, transition to relief and sustainment operations.  
Furthermore, in HA/DR operations services such as 
transportation, distribution, medical attention, and 
engineering efforts often rise to the top of the priority 
list.  Logisticians must be prepared to take the lead in 
planning for HA/DR operations. 
This thesis identifies the potential for using agent-
based models to support logistical decision-making in an 
urban, HA/DR environment.  We have developed a simulation 
using the modeling environment Map Aware Non-uniform 
Automata (MANA) which allows us to inculcate agents and 
squads with personality and physical characteristics.  Our 
scenario depicts a relief convoy, augmented with a security 
attachment, operating on urban terrain.  The convoy follows 
a given route to an HA site where they distribute food to 
neutrals (locals) who have made their way to that site. 
 xx
From the beginning, we were interested in exploring 
the complexities of HA/DR operations with the foreknowledge 
that our model would best serve as a screening tool.  To 
explore the potentially huge data space we coupled the 
technique of data farming our simulation over a cluster of 
supercomputers with a Latin Hypercube experimental design.  
We identified 40 squad/state/factor combinations and 
established 640 different design settings for those 
combinations.  Each setting was replicated 50 times 
producing a 32,000-point dataset. 
Finally, we fit our dataset and drew conclusions 
relevant to our scenario.  We used JMP Statistical 
Discovery Software™ and the additive multiple linear 
regression technique to fit our dataset.  Every term 
included in the final model was then justified and we 
interpreted the operational implications of our model.  We 
next suggested two additional models by subsetting our 
data.  The ramifications of these experiments are also 
detailed. 
The results of this thesis work suggest the following: 
• Logisticians must study HA/DR operations, paying 
attention to lessons learned and planning 
considerations. 
• There is great utility in using agent-based 
models as a means of exploring highly complex 
scenarios. 
• Logistics functionality and measures of 
effectiveness must be added to agent-based models 
in order to fully exploit their benefits. 
• Coupling intelligent designs with the speed of 
data farming has a multiplying effect on the 
number of factors that can be explored. 
 xxi
• Even though HA/DR operations are replete with 
variables, mission success may be dependent on 
only a handful of these factors. 
• Interactions between the few, highly important 
variables account for much of mission success. 
• When conducting logistics operations in an HA/DR 
environment, understanding and tapping into local 
communications is the key to mission success. 
• Marines should not predict the success of a 





























It is in the cities of the future that most 
disaster victims will be found.  People trapped 
in poverty, living on marginal land exposed to 
industrial hazards and indifferent city 
governments, will make up the majority of 
disaster victims in the near future. 
Charles Page 
International Federation of the Red Cross, 1997 
 
A.  MOTIVATION  
There are two main motivations that have driven the 
author to actively study Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster 
Relief (HA/DR) operations.  Foremost is the compelling fact 
that the Marine Corps can expect to be importuned as a 
first-responder to humanitarian crises in the future.  The 
second impetus is that in HA/DR actions the primary role, 
and in fact accountability for success, is often 
apportioned to the combat service support community. 
The Marine Corps and its Navy partner routinely 
operate in forward-deployed regions, uniquely positioning 
them to rapidly respond to pleas for help.  These cries may 
be for immediate relief from the crippling effect of a 
natural disaster, as was the case when an earthquake 
recently struck the country of Turkey.  They may be the 
swelling voices of citizens trapped in a man-made disaster 
brought on by civil conflict such as was the case most 
recently in Liberia.  In either circumstance, the Marine 
Corps and the Navy are trained and outfitted to respond 
purposefully.  The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deploys 
with a full compliment of equipment allowing it to provide 
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immediate life-saving services and then transition to 
relief and sustainment operations. 
Again, in an HA/DR environment services such as 
transportation, distribution, medical attention, and 
engineering efforts often rise to the top of the priority 
list.  Logisticians may find themselves in the unique 
position of being the main effort with infantry providing 
security for their missions.  Furthermore, logisticians 
must be prepared to take the lead in drafting operational 
plans. 
B.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the 
potential for using agent-based models (ABMs) to support 
logistical decision-making and mission success in an urban, 
HA/DR environment.  We have developed a simulation, which 
will allow us to inculcate squads with general 
characteristics, as well as personality and physical 
characteristics.  We will exploit these properties to 
answer general questions about convoy cohesiveness and 
movement speed when operating in an urban environment on a 
relief supply mission.  We also consider how information 
must propagate between neutrals in order for a maximum 
number to be fed.  Finally, we seek to identify ways agent-
based models can be used to predict starting parameter 
values for more complex models. 
C.  SCOPE 
There are an endless number of questions and issues 
regarding tactics, equipment, leadership, coordination, 
terrain effects, behavior of the neutral agents, and 
introduction of hostile agents (just to name a few) that 
could be explored.  In order to keep this thesis within the 
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limits of what can be reasonably explored, the following 
has scoped the direction of the research: 
 
• Summarize three HA/DR operations as case studies. 
• Review the lessons learned from these previous 
operations. 
• Develop an appropriate measure of effectiveness. 
• Present an overview of the functions within the 
modeling environment we have chosen. 
• Identify, from initial simulation runs, pertinent 
parameters and set factor ranges we intend to use 
in our full model. 
• Recap the creation of our simulation model. 
• Explain the design of the experiment. 
• Review data farming and explain how the technique 
has been applied to our design. 
• Fit various models to our full dataset. 
• Present the findings and make recommendations on 
how they may support logistics operations in 
humanitarian crises. 
• Consider how agent-based distillations (ABDs) may 
be used for finding beginning parameter values to 
current aggregate models. 
 
D.  INTRODUCING AGENT-BASED MODELS 
Many areas of military concern, such as command and 
control of forces, operations on urban terrain, and HA/DR 
operations, are replete with human interactions.  The 
complexity of these operations along with the confluence of 
possible interactions outside of the control of the local 
commander creates a situation that is not easily modeled.  
Increasingly these multifaceted operations are being 
studied using ABMs. 
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ABMs provide an environment in which entities, 
controlled by decision-making algorithms, can maneuver.  
These entities, known as agents, execute many local 
interactions resulting in the emergence of global 
behaviors.  The agents often interact in a self-adaptive, 
non-linear manner with each time step.  This self-adaptive 
behavior creates a vast number of variables, and 
facilitates research into emergent behaviors.  The 
aggregate effects of the myriad of individual decisions can 
be studied, for a given scenario, in order to assess the 
effects on the whole system.  These systems, including the 
agents, the environment in which they maneuver, and the 
rule-set by which they make decisions, are known as complex 
adaptive systems (CASs) [Stephen et al., 2002]. 
E.  INTRODUCING PROJECT ALBERT (PA) 
The validity and usefulness of ABMs remains an ongoing 
contention within the analysis community.  The Marine 
Corps, through the proponency of Project Albert (PA), is 
one of the leading agencies working to address this area of 
research.  Specifically, PA is interested in exploring ways 
of sorting through the huge sample spaces generated by an 
agent-based approach to gain insight into real-life, 
operational problems [Horne and Johnson, 2002].  To date, 
PA has ushered the development of several agent-based 
modeling environments.  These environments have been used 
to generate abstract models of real-world problems.  
Because of the decidedly sparse, and thereby rapid, 
approach to modeling, the project calls the abstracts 
distillations, or agent-based distillations (ABDs) [Horne 
and Johnson, 2002]. 
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Concurrently, PA has introduced the idea of data 
farming.  Data farming is an iterative technique that 
resamples areas of the data space that the analyst wants to 
research more closely.  This resampling can be conducted 
quickly because PA uses supercomputers to execute thousands 
of model runs in a relatively short amount of time [Wu, 
2002].  Furthermore, the setup and feedback of the data 
farming runs can be done over the Internet through a simple 
interface.  PA has put together a complete package, 
including a set of agent-based models, an easy-to-use data 
farming process, and visualization tools, which facilitates 
research into CASs. 
F.  INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM 
Most operators, logisticians, and analysts think of 
logistics support in terms of hard numbers, such as the 
number of meals delivered or the number of miles driven. 
However, logistical scenarios are exactly the type of 
loosely-defined problems which lend themselves well to 
abstract study using agents.  For example, one can think of 
any number of decisions that could affect the success of a 
simple resupply mission in an urban HA/DR environment.  
Intangibles, such as foot traffic, road accessibility, 
harassment, and the necessary interaction between the 
military and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 
Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) can all have effects 
on the success of the operation.  This thesis will apply 
data farming techniques to an ABD that models logistics 
support in a HA/DR environment in order to identify which 




G.  INTRODUCING OUR SIMULATION 
While our simulation model will be fully developed in 
a later chapter, a snapshot of the base-case scenario will 
be given here to facilitate the problem description and 
formulation.  This screenshot is best viewed in color.  
Figure 1 depicts a screen capture of an execution of our 
ABM.  We developed the simulation in the modeling 
environment Map Aware Non-uniform Automata (MANA, 
pronounced marnar).  Blue agents in the screen shot 
represent a convoy of relief supplies, including a U.S. 
Marine Corps security element.  The yellow entities are 
neutral agents, those requiring aid.  We have included a 
lone red agent in our base-case scenario to introduce the 
possibility of random harassing fire as might be 
encountered in a man-made humanitarian crisis such as a 
civil war. 
 
Figure 1.   MANA food distribution base-case depiction. 
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H.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II begins by covering the background relative 
to why this thesis is both timely and important to future 
conflicts and crises.  We then justify the aspects of HA/DR 
operations we have tried to include in our model.  Next we 
discuss, in general terms, appropriate Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) for HA/DR operations and how we 
arrived at the specific MOE used in our analysis. 
In the third chapter, the internal workings of MANA 
and the principles of data farming are discussed more 
thoroughly.  The setup of our scenario is delineated, 
including what each parameter value is meant to represent 
and how those values were chosen.  The results of initial 
runs are explained as a means of introducing the model used 
in the final analysis. 
Chapter IV describes the analysis methodology used to 
fit and interpret the final MANA model.  We also discuss 
the output from our model and the various statistical tools 
used for analysis. 
The simulation results and models we fitted, along 
with a thorough discussion, are presented in Chapter V.  
Finally, conclusions and recommendations for future 
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II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
…an international coalition analogous to Desert 
Storm, built around a core of two U.S. divisions 
and led by the First Marine Expeditionary Force… 
Only this sort of large-scale, rapid-action force 
could blanket and extinguish the conflict so that 
relief supplies could reach the hundreds of 
thousands of people at risk before it was too 
late. 
Ambassador Robert Oakley 
Special Envoy for Somalia, 1997 
 
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter opens by defining many of the expressions 
included in the body of verbage common to the HA/DR 
community, as well as lingua franca used by those operating 
within the PA arena.  Next we present three significant 
HA/DR actions as a means of conveying the core of what is 
typically required of responding agencies.  From these 
operations we glean a number of lessons learned that we 
have then tried to incorporate into our model.  We discuss 
the problems inherent with selecting a measure of 
effectiveness in an HA/DR operation and then justify the 
choice we have made.  As a final point, this section 
explicates the motivation behind why we were interested in 
researching this problem. 
B.  DEFINITIONS 
The breadth and scope of HA/DR operations, along with 
the plethora of responding agencies, contribute to an on-
going problem within the community of imprecise 
definitions.  Whenever possible we will use definitions 
taken from Department of Defense sources.  If a definition 
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comes from another source, that will be noted.  We also 
define many of the terms common to the PA environment. 
• Agent Based Distillation (ABD) – the term used to 
reflect the difference between MANA and more 
detailed models that also use agents.  The term 
reflects the intention to model just the essence 
of a problem [Anderson et al., 2003]. 
• Agent Based Model (ABM) – a model that contains 
entities that are controlled by decision-making 
algorithms [Anderson et al., 2003]. 
• Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) – agent-based 
models consisting of entities, controlled by 
decision-making algorithms, reacting individually 
but creating an emergent global response 
[Anderson et al., 2003]. 
• Data Farming – the application of agent-based 
models, computing power, and data visualization 
to help answer complex questions [Wu, 2002]. 
• (Foreign) Disaster Relief (DR) – Prompt aid which 
can be used to alleviate the suffering of 
(foreign) disaster victims [MCWL, 1999]. 
• Humanitarian Assistance (HA) – Programs conducted 
to relieve or reduce the results of natural or 
manmade disasters or other endemic conditions 
such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation 
that might present a serious threat to life or 
that can result in great damage to or loss of 
property [MCWL, 1999]. 
• Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) – 
Transnational organizations of private citizens 
that maintain a consultative status with the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
[MCWL, 1999]. 
• Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO) – Private, 
non-profit humanitarian assistance organizations 
involved in development and relief activities.  





C.  BACKGROUND 
Much of the data given as background in this section 
has been culled from many sources and often varies from 
source to source.  The data usually was not originally 
gathered for the specific purpose of compiling statistics 
and should therefore be regarded as indicative rather than 
exact.  These statistics are offered in order to gauge the 
relative changes that have taken place. 
With the fall of the Iron Curtain the geo-political 
landscape changed significantly.  The international balance 
of power, that had been consolidated in the hands of the 
two nuclear superpowers (the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.), began 
to be diffused to nations with regional strength.  The 
relative strength of the world’s remaining superpower (the 
U.S.) has declined even though its absolute strength 
remains unchallenged.  The U.S. found itself thrust into 
the position of being the only nation capable of 
responding, worldwide, to crisis or conflict. 
It was thought that the end of the Cold War would 
usher in a time of world peace and, undoubtedly, the 
prospect of global nuclear war is no longer with us.  
However, during the Cold War there was a sense the 
superpowers would keep their proxy nations in check, 
thereby suppressing regional aggression.  Since then the 
reality is conflict has increased rather than diminished, 
especially small-scale or Low Intensity Conflict (LIC).  
International trade has clashed with national fractions, 
ancient ethnic rivalries, and religious divisions, to set 
the stage for constant political and social unrest. 
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Between 1948 and 1978 the United Nations Security 
Council approved only 13 peace operations and none at all 
from 1979 to 1987; thus approving a total of only thirteen 
in almost 40 years.  From 1988 through December 1999, 38 
peace operations were established [CBO Paper, 1999].  This 
trend is expected to continue.  The Global Humanitarian 
Emergencies Projection [NIC, 2001] suggests that, although 
the number of acute world emergencies is down from 25 in 
January of 2000, there are presently 20 humanitarian crises 
ongoing in the world.  In addition, this report cites 
internal war as a main cause for the proliferation and 
prolongation of these humanitarian crises.  The upswing in 
civil unrest within nations is generally thought to be 
related to the breakdown of the de facto bi-polar 
superpower arrangement. 
It should also be noted that these 20 emergencies 
encompass only the most acute problems.  The World 
Disasters Report, published yearly by the Red Cross, 
counted 39 countries in 1998 where people were in need of 
some sort of assistance [IFRC, 1998].  Appendix A provides 
specific details on the number of people affected and the 
types of emergencies they are facing.  Also in Appendix A 
is a table showing the 39 countries that were most at risk 
and what types of privations they faced. 
The emergence of the United States as the world’s only 
superpower has thrust America into the position of global 
mediator and provider in times of crisis.  As this nation’s 
“911” force, the Marine Corps has often been the initial 
force responding to cries for help, whether these pleas are 
the result of internal chaos or natural disasters.  Over 
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the past dozen years the Marine Corps has participated in 
numerous HA/DR operations.  In May 1991, Marines returning 
from Operation Desert Storm were diverted to provide 
immediate assistance to the country of Bangladesh following 
a cyclone that killed more than 139,000 people and left 2.7 
million homeless [Trader et al., 1998]!  At the same time, 
Operation Provide Comfort brought relief supplies to more 
than one million refugees in the mountains of northern Iraq 
[Trader et al., 1998].  Sub-freezing temperatures, disease, 
malnutrition, and dehydration were mitigated through the 
efforts of Marines and others.  Marines participated in 
Operation Restore Hope in December of 1992, providing 
hunger relief to the country of Somalia at a time when 3000 
Somalis per day were dying and another 1.5 million were at 
risk of starvation [U.S. Army War College, 1997].  Recently 
Marines responded with aid to the people of East Timor and 
Afghanistan.  Currently there are Marines providing limited 
support to a multi-national peacekeeping force in the 
country of Liberia. 
If we have not yet provided convincing evidence of the 
importance and current application of this research, 
consider the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell when 
he spoke on August 11th 2003 regarding the situation in 
Liberia.  The secretary cited a “desperate need for food to 
be delivered” and said Marines could help secure the port 
and bring humanitarian supplies ashore [Vick, 2003].  The 
Marine Corps can expect to be further involved in these 
types of operations in the near and continuing future. 
D.  THREE HA/DR CASE-STUDIES 
By taking a brief look at past HA/DR operations we can 
learn general lessons that may be incorporated into our 
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model.  We have chosen these three operations for several 
reasons.  First, in each case, Marines were directly 
involved immediately upon onset of the crisis.  We believe 
future crises will see the introduction of Marines at onset 
for two reasons: Marines are forward-deployed and thus 
readily available, and the Marine Corps is equipped with 
helicopters, trucks, generators, amphibious craft, water 
purifying equipment, and much more which enable it to 
immediately save lives and offer assistance.  Another 
reason for studying this set of operations is their tasks 
parallel the type of operations we wanted to model. 
Finally, the three operations cover the spectrum of the 
level of violence involved in HA/DR operations and cover 
the degree of involvement Marines had in rendering 
humanitarian assistance.  Although there are several 
studies containing summaries of past HA/DR operations, we 
have relied on Trader et al., 1998 for this summary. 
1. Operation Provide Comfort 
In late February and early March of 1991, Iraqi Kurds, 
emboldened by the defeat of the Iraqi army, and with the 
encouragement of the U.S. government, rebelled against the 
Iraqi government.  The uprising was quickly and brutally 
suppressed, causing over one million Kurds to flee into the 
mountains of Turkey and Iran.  The refugees suddenly found 
themselves without shelter and in need of water, food, and 
medicine.  This need, coupled with sub-freezing 
temperatures, led to rampant exposure, dehydration, hunger, 
and disease, as well as outbreaks of cholera, dysentery, 
measles, and typhus.  The President authorized an immediate 
airlift of supplies, and a plan was drawn up to establish a 
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safe haven within Iraq and encourage the repatriation of 
the Kurds. 
At this point it is essential to introduce the idea 
that every HA/DR operation will include tasks that are 
political in nature.  As egalitarian as we Americans like 
to believe we are, the United States government has an 
opportunity and agenda that dovetail with any immediate 
crisis.  That is to say, while we may be feeding people or 
delivering life-saving medicine, there is a greater, long-
term political goal the United States hopes to further.  
This point should not be considered callous or seen as 
negative.  It is simply a function of trying to treat the 
cause of a crisis as well as its symptoms.  For example, in 
providing relief to the Kurds, we also hoped to nurture a 
relationship with them that would one day be used as a base 
of support in the ouster of Saddam Hussein from Iraq. 
The Operation Order for Operation Provide Comfort 
included the following tasks: 
• Coordinate drop zones and food distribution. 
• Conduct census, organize camps and food and water 
distribution, improve sanitation, and provide 
medical care. 
• Identify site locations for temporary shelter out 
of the mountains. 
• Erect temporary living facilities. 
• Relocate Iraqi Kurd displaced civilians to 
supportable locations. 
• Establish way stations along the routes between 
refugee camps and Zakho. 
• Prepare Zakho for refugees. 
• Facilitate transfer of Kurds back to their homes. 
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• Integrate civilian agencies into process of 
getting Kurds out of the mountains and into 
transition refugee camps, and eventually 
returning them to their homes. 
• Transfer administrative and support functions to 
civilian organizations. 
Before beginning our analysis of this operation we 
will introduce the other two operations and then summarize 
the lessons learned from all three at once. 
2. Operation Sea Angel 
In May 1991, a cyclone hit Bangladesh killing more 
than 139,000 people and leaving approximately 2.7 million 
homeless.  The storm also caused extensive damage to the 
country’s infrastructure, particularly roads and 
communications networks.  Seaports and airports were 
inoperable, making it very difficult for assessment teams 
and relief agencies to enter the country.  When relief 
supplies were introduced into the country, the extent of 
damage to the lines of communication (LOC) made 
distribution nearly impossible overland.  Helicopters, 
landing craft, and amphibious vehicles were needed. 
The President authorized U.S. forces to conduct relief 
missions.  Because it was important to facilitate the 
perception that the newly-formed democratic Bengalese 
government was in control of the relief effort, Marines 
conducted most of their operations from off-shore.  The 
After Action Report described the following set of tasks: 
• Conduct surface and helicopter support missions 
for disaster relief operations. 
• Coordinate operations. 
• Provide communications capabilities and support 
to assessment teams and NGOs. 
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• Provide transport of relief supplies. 
• Conduct reconnaissance of rivers, landing zones, 
beaches, cushion landing zones, and landing 
sites. 
• Conduct assessments of areas requiring immediate 
assistance. 
• Load/unload supplies at airports. 
• Conduct damage, engineering, and medical 
assessments. 
• Establish sites, where directed, to provide 
water. 
• Conduct daily coordination meetings with 
government of Bangladesh to coordinate relief 
efforts. 
• Coordinate with other international partners 
assisting the relief effort. 
3. Operation Restore Hope 
Following the overthrow of the President of Somalia in 
1991, the country deteriorated into anarchy as tribal 
factions vied for control.  Incident to the fall of the 
government, several humanitarian organizations had been 
providing foodstuffs.  These organizations immediately 
became the target of banditry and lawlessness, causing the 
onset of a famine that eventually swept over the entire 
country.  The United Nations initially sent 500 troops to 
provide security for NGO/PVO relief workers.  By the summer 
of 1992 it was clear a stronger force was needed and a 
large-scale relief effort was in order.  The Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assessment, an arm of the State 
Department, had estimated “one quarter of the population at 
risk of starvation, one-fourth of all children under the 
age of five already dead and 800,000 Somalis displaced or 
refugees” [9].  The President announced Operation Provide 
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Relief to provide an emergency food airlift.  The military 
mission had four objectives: 
• Secure major air and seaports, key installations, 
and food distribution points. 
• Provide open and free passage of relief supplies. 
• Provide security for convoys and relief 
organization operations. 
• Assist UN/NGOs in providing humanitarian relief 
operations under UN auspices. 
E.  LESSONS LEARNED 
A large body of lessons learned has emerged from these 
and other humanitarian operations.  The list we present is 
certainly not all-inclusive but contains the major aspects 
that should be kept in mind when planning HA/DR operations. 
• Plan the political, military, and humanitarian 
campaign as a unified, whole effort. 
• Initiate action as soon as possible.  The most 
dramatic return on investment of manpower, 
equipment, and relief supplies is realized in the 
initial stages of the operation. 
• Set measurable and realistic tactical and 
operational objectives with the end-state and 
timeline in mind. 
• Continually reassess the political, military, 
security, and humanitarian situation with respect 
to those objectives. 
• As much as possible, foster and maintain unity of 
command and cohesion of effort among the various 
NGOs/PVOs, military, international, and host-
nation agencies. 
• Wage a multifaceted information campaign aimed at 
the local population and broaden public opinion. 
• Do not settle for partial solutions that leave 
room for problems further down the road. 
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• Plan for a gradual turnover of the effort, from 
military and relief groups, to civilian and 
international development agencies. 
F. LEARNING FROM THE PAST 
In the operations summarized and the lessons learned, 
there are a number of common ideas.  We believe these ideas 
will be common to future HA/DR operations and try to 
incorporate them into our research model.  We now describe 
those elements. 
1. Convoy Operations 
Each of the abovementioned operations involved the 
transportation and/or distribution of relief supplies.  
There are a number of ways to measure the effectiveness of 
such tasks.  This is an aspect of HA/DR scenarios that we 
can both model and measure, so the core of our scenario is 
built around a relief convoy enhanced with a Marine 
security detachment. 
2. Humanitarian Assistance Sites 
In each of the case studies a secure HA site needed to 
be established, and, in the case of the non-permissive 
environments, security of the relief effort itself was 
undertaken.  We have included two secure humanitarian sites 
in our simulation. 
3. Civil/Military Cooperation 
Throughout the lessons learned, and in each of the 
operations presented, there was a call for deeper 
military/civilian coordination.  In our model, Marines 
provide direct support to a supply convoy.  While we do not 
explicitly formulate agents or networks to model 
military/civilian interaction, we believe our depiction is 
general enough to consider the convoy as either an NGO/PVO 
or as a Marine Corps asset. 
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4. Urban Environments 
There are two urban scenarios that this thesis 
attempts to address.  The first reflects the case where 
affected people stay home but still require humanitarian 
aid.  The second considers the situation where people are 
displaced and stay in a host community [IFRC, 1998].   
In the first scenario, the affected population remains 
in their homes.  This is usually the case when there has 
been a natural disaster such as a hurricane, flood, or 
earthquake that does not necessarily destroy homes, 
although they may be damaged, but does cut off or infringe 
on local services.  This situation may also arise, as in 
our simulation, when there is short-term famine.  Whenever 
residents have the option to stay in their own homes they 
will choose to do so, because they are familiar with the 
surroundings, can prevent looting, and can move within the 
familiarity and security of their local community.  In the 
long run this is a much more sustainable solution which 
facilitates a quicker return to normalcy than responses 
which require residents to relocate.  In such cases there 
is potential for the emergency to be short-lived. 
The second scenario involves people who are displaced, 
by either a natural or man-made disaster, and stay in host 
communities.  For example, extensive flooding or regional 
civil strife may drive people from their homes.  They will 
often migrate to the next closest population center or the 
location of their closest relatives.  When this happens, 
governments and agencies will need to provide relief to the 
entire population since both residents and displaced people 
are affected.  Our model easily embodies this scenario if 
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we consider the HA sites as community feeding centers, 
similar to our “soup kitchens.” 
G.  DETERMINING A MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) 
1. What is an MOE? 
An MOE is an objective, quantitative expression of 
performance appropriate to the context in which it is being 
used.  Generally an MOE relates resources input to obtain a 
given measure of output.  An MOE must have real scales upon 
which to measure inputs and outputs.  Schrady says, “MOEs 
in the affairs of man and society tend to be relative 
rather than absolute” [Schrady, 1989].  Identifying 
appropriate MOEs in HA/DR operations will always be 
controversial because of the political nature of the 
operations themselves.  A Center for Naval Analysis report 
[CNA, 1996] identifies five types of measures. 
The five measures they offer are applicable only 
within a given level of warfare -- tactical, operational, 
or strategic.  Following are the five measures and what 
they are intended to reveal: 
• Level-of-Effort measures describe the magnitude 
of specific force actions.  Examples include tons 
or food delivered or number of convoys escorted.  
As such, these measures are not MOEs but give 
support to MOEs. 
• Task-performance MOEs encompass many of the 
actions described by individual level-of-effort 
measures, placing these actions into a larger 
context.  These measures compare the action 
undertaken to address a specific situation with 
the total requirement. 
• Mission-level MOEs are broader still, providing 
insight into progress toward the larger political 
objectives. 
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• Transition measures provide insight into progress 
toward the transition of responsibilities to 
another force or organization. 
• General indicators provide insight into progress 
on improving the situation.  These are a non-
quantitative tool –- a supplement to MOEs –- that 
can indicate progress.  An example would be 
crowds returning to marketplaces. 
So, from the list above, we see we can measure effort 
at the task level or the mission level.  Level-of-effort 
measures will support our task-performance measures.  
Transition measures are beyond the scope of what we intend 
to cover; nor we will we consider general indicators.  
Furthermore, it will help to limit our discussion to the 
tactical level.  At the operational level or above we 
quickly get tied to political objectives that are neither 
easily defined nor readily measurable. 
2. Common Problems in Choosing an MOE 
In October of 1998 Hurricane Mitch veered toward the 
countries of Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala 
with initial sustained winds recorded at 180 miles per hour 
and gusts reaching well over 200 mph, making Mitch one of 
the strongest hurricanes ever.  By the time Mitch reached 
the coast, its wind speed and rate of advance slowed 
considerably.  Mitch covered only 600 miles in 6 days at a 
sustained speed of only 4 knots.  Its torrential rains 
unleashed massive floods and mudslides with devastating 
results.  In Honduras alone there were an estimated 6,000 
deaths and 8,000 more people missing.  A staggering 1.4 
million were left homeless!  To put this in perspective, 
“If the population of the United States suffered a disaster 
on the same scale as the population of Honduras, Hurricane  
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Mitch would have killed 250,000 Americans and forced one 
out of every four U.S. citizens from their homes” [OASDPHA, 
2001]. 
Southern Command reported that U.S. forces 
reconstructed 162 miles of roads and 13 bridges, a 
substantial accomplishment considering the logistical 
challenges of operating in an inaccessible, austere 
environment.  On the other hand, critics have said these 
construction projects amount to less than 2% of the 
highways damaged in Honduras and Nicaragua alone, and about 
4%-6% of the bridges damaged or destroyed in the four 
affected countries [OASDPHA, 2001]. 
Here we have an example of measurable objectives -- 
the number of miles of road rebuilt and the number of 
bridges repaired.  However, we are left wondering about the 
priorities of these objectives relative to other 
objectives.  It may be that building roads, while necessary 
for long-term redevelopment, pales in comparison with the 
need for the production and distribution of potable water, 
for example.  The other problem Southern Command’s critics 
bring out is we need to measure our objectives as ratios or 
rates relative to some established standard.  For example, 
counting the number of people fed is only informative when 
we know what percentage of the population required food. 
Another problem noted with some MOEs is their 
comprehensiveness or ability to fully measure for mission 
success.  We may be required to implement several MOEs to 
completely assess how we are accomplishing the list of 
tasks.  We want to ensure we are measuring the 
effectiveness of the effort as a whole and not just one 
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aspect of the effort or our local piece of the relief 
mission.  Reliance on a single MOE to account for a problem 
with many causes is inadequate.  A combination of 
measurements among the various agencies will ensure we are 
capturing the totality of the relief effort. 
A second concern is sensitivity to trends.  MOEs 
should be formulated in such a way as to collect 
information that will identify trends.  In HA/DR operations 
it is often more important to note trends, such as the rate 
of decline in the number of dysentery cases, than simply to 
collect strict numbers.  There is an art to choosing an MOE 
that measures what we want to test in a way that does not 
assume away tangent factors. 
3. Our Choice of an MOE 
Based on the preceding discussion we settled on a 
task-performance MOE.  We will measure the ratio of 
neutrals fed to the total population.  Admittedly, in part 
we have chosen this MOE because we are forced to work with 
the measurements that the software provides but we still 
believe this is an appropriate MOE and offer the following 
justification.  The CNA suggests that MOEs meet the 
following criteria [CNA, 1996]: 
• The MOE should relate to the overarching mission, 
not solely on the military task.  Our ratio does 
that. 
• Measurements should be meaningful.  They should 
focus on the effectiveness of a task rather than 
on accomplishing the task.  So the ratio is 
preferable to, say, time to complete the mission. 
• MOEs should be timely or responsive to changes 
they are trying to measure.  The ratio of the 
number fed is sensitive to trends. 
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• MOEs should be cost effective.  Collecting the 
information to assess one’s effectiveness should 
not put an undue burden on those providing 
relief.  Our ratio is simple to compute given 
that we know the population of the affected area 
and can count the number of people we serve. 
There are two final notes to include: established 
standards within the relief community and how the DOD is 
meeting that standard.  In 1998 a global conference was 
held for the purpose of adopting international standards 
for humanitarian relief.  The project is known as the 
Sphere Project and the result was the Humanitarian Charter 
and Minimum Standards in Disaster Relief [The Sphere 
Project, 2000].  This document has become the standard in 
HA/DR planning and execution.  For example, we find that 
the minimum daily food requirement is 2,100 kcals per 
person per day.  Additionally, 10-12% of total energy is to 
be provided by protein and 17% by fat. 
When considering our MOE we reasoned through what 
exactly it meant to feed the neutrals in our scenario.  The 
Department of Defense inventory includes Humanitarian Daily 
Rations (HDRs) intended to meet the standards set forth by 
the Sphere Project [DLA, 2003].  HDRs are designed to be 
culturally neutral; to provide the widest possible 
acceptance from potential victims of varying religious, 
cultural, and dietary backgrounds.  Each HDR contains one 
day’s supply of food and there are 10 HDRs packaged per 
case [DLA].  One medium lift military vehicle can easily 
carry three pallets, and each pallet holds 24 cases.  So 3 
pallets X 240 HDRs = 720 meals per truck. 
In our scenario we have 70 neutrals, each representing 
a household of 8 people.  So the daily requirement is 8 
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people per family X 70 families = 560 meals.  We can see 
that even one truck easily meets the daily requirement.  
The notion is that this relief convoy would be serving 
several areas. 
The next chapter begins with a comparison of MANA to 
other agent-based modeling environments.  We will fully 
explain the motivation behind using MANA to develop our 
scenario.  We define all of the variables used and justify 
the ranges we chose to vary. 
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III. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
Having precise ideas often leads to a man doing 
nothing. 
Paul Valery (1871-1945) 
Early, 20th Century French Poet 
 
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter covers the genesis of MANA and how to 
build scenarios in MANA.  We hope to leave the reader with 
a thorough understanding of how the model works.  Our 
scenario, and its evolution over time, will be considered 
extensively.  We will outline the numerous sample runs made 
to determine our final factor settings.  Appendix B 
contains a detailed explanation of the model parameters 
along with the ranges we chose to sample.  Before beginning 
however, a discussion of alternative agent-based modeling 
environments is warranted. 
The author’s initial concept was to set up the same 
scenario in three different PA agent-based programs, MANA, 
PYTHAGORAS, and SOCRATES [Project Albert, 2003].  
Implementing the same scenario in all three environments 
was seen as a way to try to validate the results between 
programs.  A good deal of time was spent setting up the 
scenario in the three programs; they each have strengths 
and weaknesses.  After examination of program assumptions 
and experience in setting up and executing scenarios, it 
was deemed this approach was not feasible because of the 
differences in the underlying movement and personality 
algorithms, not to mention the differences in interactions 
between terrain and agents, within the models.  The 
resulting models were very different when we used separate 
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agent-based approaches.  MANA was selected as the program 
of choice based on the compatibility of its assumptions and 
algorithms with the research objectives.   
B.  AN INTRODUCTION TO MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA 
(MANA) 
Much of the information in this section of the chapter 
is taken from the MANA User’s Manuals, versions 2.0 and 2.1 
[Stephen et al., 2002 and Anderson et al., 2003].  First we 
will identify why MANA was created and what types of 
questions are appropriate for MANA to answer.  Next, we 
will connect our research to this tool by making clear how 
we intended to exploit MANA’s strengths to answer our 
questions of interest.  General squad characteristics, 
terrain properties, and communications are defined in the 
following sections.  The last partition uncovers what we 
believed to be “bugs” in MANA. 
As an overview, MANA is an object-oriented program 
written in the Delphi Object Pascal language.  MANA files 
are saved as xml files making them easily transportable 
over the web.  A single MANA run requires the xml scenario 
file as well as a terrain map in bitmap format. 
1. The Purpose of MANA 
MANA was developed by the Defence Technology Agency 
(DTA) of the New Zealand Defence Force. They saw the need 
for a simulation that was less scripted, easier to set up, 
and more representative of the interactions and intangibles 
of warfare than currently available in conventional combat 
models.  The user’s manual opens with the following 
statement, “The history of physics has been characterized 
by the search for systems simple enough to be able to be 
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described with a high degree of accuracy by mathematical 
equations.”  However, the developers then go on to say, 
To this day, there exists no set of equations 
that can with absolute certainty predict the 
evolution of the vast majority of phenomena we 
see in everyday life for any significant period 
into the future.  Therefore, to rely on models 
built “on a bedrock of physics” is to deceive 
ourselves.  It is a myth that a more detailed 
model is necessarily a better model, because it 
is impossible to capture accurately every aspect 
of nature.  In fact, the more detailed a model 
is, the more obscure its workings, a problem that 
is compounded if the user is not the model 
designer.  Furthermore, the non-linear nature of 
equations describing many real world phenomena 
makes them extremely sensitive to initial 
conditions.  This means that even infinitesimal 
errors in describing the real world initial 
conditions will cause the model to make 
predictions that are almost uncorrelated with 
actual events [Anderson et al., 2003]. 
It was for this reason DTA developed MANA as a means of 
exploring complex problems. 
MANA is designed to quickly build scenarios addressing 
a broad range of problems.  The behavior of agents is 
decidedly not pre-potted.  DTA argues that, “there seems to 
be a school of analysts who believe that just because they 
have an equation to describe some aspect of a scenario, 
then that aspect must be more “real” than the aspects of 
the scenario that cannot be so easily described.”  DTA’s 
belief is that the more difficult an aspect is to describe 
the more important it is.  So they based the development of 
MANA on two key ideas [Anderson et al., 2003]: 
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• That the behavior of the entities within a combat 
model (both friend and foe) is a critical 
component of the analysis of the possible 
outcomes. 
• That we are wasting our time with highly detailed 
models for determining force mixes and combat 
effectiveness. 
2. Why We Chose MANA 
Given the nature of HA/DR operations described in the 
last chapter, it seemed to us that to try to explicitly 
model an urban humanitarian crisis would be an arduous and 
futile task to say the least.  An agent-based approach, 
capturing just the essence of the problem, was certainly a 
more attainable objective.  Furthermore, our assessment 
followed that of DTA regarding robustness.  The complexity 
of HA/DR operations makes it nearly impossible to build a 
scenario that is even the slightest bit robust.  If we 
attempted to model a very specific scenario, that complex 
model would have been necessarily scripted and, although it 
may have provided more concrete answers to an exact 
situation, would not in general give us a transportable set 
of concepts or enable us to extrapolate.  We set out, not 
to find the answer, but to learn what is important when 
faced with a situation where a forward-deployed MEU, 
operating in a third world city, was tasked with a food 
distribution relief mission. 
It is important to point out MANA’s limitations; MANA 
is not intended to describe every aspect of an operation.  
The modeler must have a clear idea of what he or she is 
intending to model as the scenario is set up.  With a 
general idea of how the scenario should unfold, we began 
experimenting with the various parameters by trying them at 
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different levels.  As an example of the nonlinear nature of 
complex adaptive systems, we observed odd behaviors of the 
convoy, including driving through buildings on some 
realizations and behaving more as expected, i.e., not 
driving through buildings, on others given the same 
parameter settings.  This is just one example of the non-
linear nature of CASs and characteristic of the type of 
behavior expected from MANA.  While we were frustrated with 
these outcomes and tried to vary settings to force these 
“mistakes” out of our model, we concede the randomness and 
unpredictability were exactly what we desired.  We wanted a 
medium that would allow for a great range of possible 
outcomes and answers.  It has been this author’s experience 
that there is certainly not one right way to do logistics.  
Furthermore, while we enumerated general rules of thumb for 
HA/DR operations in Chapter II, each real situation is 
dependent on a huge number of variables, most of which are 
outside of the control of the local commander. 
In the end we chose MANA because it provides a medium 
for assessing global outcomes resulting from thousands of 
local decisions.  We believed this was an appropriate tool 
to accurately describe HA/DR operations and, particularly, 
the confluence of logistics and humanitarian assistance. 
C. FEATURES WITHIN MANA 
In this section we will present the workings of MANA 
as we describe in detail the evolution of our model. 
1. Squad Properties in MANA 
Squad parameters in MANA can be divided into four 
groups: personality weightings, move constraints, basic 
capabilities of automata, and options that affect movement 
characteristics. 
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Personality weightings determine an automata’s (or 
individual agent’s) propensity to move towards or away from 
something.  An agent may be weighted to approach or flee 
from friendly or enemy units, its waypoints, easy terrain, 
or its final goal. 
The second set of parameters deals with move 
constraints.  Move constraints act as conditional modifiers 
to this process.  For example, the Cluster parameter turns 
off an automata’s propensity to move towards friends when 
those friends are clustered together in a greater number 
than some specified size.  The Advance constraint prevents 
an agent from moving towards its next objective without a 
minimum number of friendly units accompanying it.  Finally, 
the Combat constraint determines the minimum local 
numerical advantage a group of agents requires before they 
attack an enemy. 
The third set of parameters describes basic 
capabilities of automata such as weapons, sensors, movement 
speed, and interactions.  Closely tied to these settings is 
the Situational Awareness (SA) map which allows agents to 
communicate the position of enemy to other friendly agents. 
The final set of parameters provides options on the 
movement characteristics of the agents, including things 
like whether the terrain will effect their movement, the 
degree of randomness when choosing a move, and if obstacles 
should be avoided.  This final set of parameters will be 
induced to a greater or lesser degree depending on the type 




2. Terrain in MANA 
The default board in MANA is a 200 x 200 grid of 
cells, and there are four different types of cells 
representing different aspects of movement potential.  Each 
cell can be occupied by only one agent at any given time 
step.  The different types of cells have differing effects 
on movement.  Some allow free movement while others 
completely restrict movement.  Some serve as barriers to 
line-of-sight, provide cover or concealment, or affect the 
speed of an agent as it moves through the area. 
Billiard Table cells are plain terrain with no special 
properties.  Billiard Table appears black in color within 
the model.  The second type of terrain or cell is Easy 
Going terrain which represents roads or other regions 
attractive to agents who are parameterized to prefer this 
type of terrain.  These areas are represented in yellow in 
MANA.  Walls, the third type of terrain, are shown in light 
gray.  No entity may occupy or move through a Wall cell and 
agents cannot see through Walls if the line of sight 
feature is activated.  The fourth type, Light and Dense 
Brush, appear green and can be set to provide varying 
degrees of cover and concealment as well as to have an 
effect on movement speeds. 
Terrain is introduced into a MANA scenario by loading 
a bitmap into the MANA file.  The bitmap could be a 
scenario drawn by the modeler, an actual map, a picture, or 
any other image translated into bitmap form.  MANA agents 
will only recognize green, yellow, gray, and black however.  
The program attempts to interpret the image in these four 
colors and the agents will act on that translation.  MANA 
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offers a feature called terrain as seen by agents that 
allows the modeler to determine how the bitmap has been 
translated into colors interpretable by the agents. 
3. The Situational Awareness (SA) Map in MANA 
Agents form squads and squads band together to form 
allegiances.  Agents with the same allegiance share 
information by way of the Situational Awareness (SA) map 
shown in Figure 2.  This map is a memory of the locations 
of enemy squads in the form of a collective picture of 
sensor information.  As such, the SA map is always being 
updated by any agent within the squad who has information 
on the location of enemy agents.  In this way, MANA 
portrays communication between squads and between agents 
within a squad. 
 
Figure 2.   Sample Situational Awareness (SA) Map. 
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Enemy locations on the SA map are color-coded.  The 
squares indicate the location of the enemy while the rings 
show their threat influence.  Red represents enemy with the 
highest level of threat, yellow is a medium threat enemy, 
and light gray shows the enemy I am least afraid of.  When 
squads are created, they are given a threat level as a 
characteristic and this threat level is global.  In other 
words, that squad will appear as that level threat to any 
other squad not of the same allegiance.  For example, it 
may be a squad of tanks is labeled threat level 3 whereas a 
squad of neutrals receives a threat level of 1. 
A squad’s personality parameters can be used to get 
entities to respond to different threat levels in different 
ways.  MANA allows the modeler to cause agents to either be 
attracted to or be repelled by enemy agents of particular 
threats.  Furthermore, we have the latitude to pursue any 
of the threats more or less vigorously by manipulating an 
agent’s personality parameters. 
MANA uses the threat persistence parameter to specify 
how long a sighting will remain on the SA map.  This factor 
is a way of indicating the transient nature of 
intelligence.  After some time, intelligence may become 
unreliable.  Caution must be exercised when varying this 
parameter because the longer the threat persistence the 
larger the number of sightings that will remain on the SA 
map.  There is the potential for information overload. 
The circle around an agent on the SA map, as shown in 
Figure 2, shows the region in which that agent will react 
to an enemy.  For example, just because an automata knows 
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an enemy is present at a certain location does not 
automatically mean the agent will react to that enemy.  
Only when an enemy enters the circle will a reaction be 
triggered.  This allows agents to keep their distances from 
known enemy positions, without necessarily running away 
from them.  Likewise, if an agent’s personality is such 
that it chases enemies, threat influence represents how 
close that enemy needs to be before the agent will bother 
chasing.  The threat influence parameter lets the modeler 
specify this range at which action will be initiated. 
4. “Bugs” in MANA 
We encountered three main problems with the model.  
The first was simply a clarification which should be made 
to the documentation.  In the user’s manual threat 
influence was presented as the radius of the ring around an 
agent which will induce another agent’s action.  In other 
words, if a truck agent’s threat influence ring is larger, 
neutral agents will respond differently than if the ring is 
smaller.  In reality, this ring will induce the actions of 
the agent owning the ring.  A larger threat ring around the 
truck will cause that truck to react differently than if 
the ring were smaller. 
We stumbled upon our second problem when we made runs 
for our full model.  MANA’s user manual indicated the range 
of the precision parameter was from zero to 1000.  We found 
if we entered zero locally, MANA would default and put a 
value of one in its place.  Prior to discovering this, we 
sent off our design to be run on the supercomputing cluster 
with the lowest precision design point set to zero.  Our 
results indicated, when the model was running in batch 
mode, MANA did not default the setting to a one.  At this 
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point the problem is being researched and we do not have a 
conclusive answer as to what happens in batch mode. 
The third problem we discovered early on; it has since 
been corrected.  This problem was in the way the movement 
algorithm had been coded.  MANA used three digits to 
calculate speed; call them YXX.  If XX was 00, then the 
agent would move Y spaces with 100% probability but if XX 
was anything other than 00, then the agent would move Y + 1 
space(s) with probability XX%.  So a speed setting of 050 
would cause an agent to move zero spaces 50% of the time 
and one space 50% of the time.  But a speed of 150 produced 
a counterintuitive effect.  It meant the agent would move 
zero spaces 50% of the time and two spaces 50% of the time.  
The speed settings have since been changed to be strictly 
increasing, so that an agent whose speed is 150 will move 
one space 100% of the time and an additional space 50% of 
the time. 
A little further discussion is warranted.  We found it 
appealing that there was randomness in the way MANA 
calculated movement.  When we thought about what affect 
this algorithm might have on convoy movement behavior we 
noted it allowed for stuttered, variable movement rates 
rather than strictly constant speeds.  We believe stops-
and-starts more appropriately depict movement of vehicles, 
and individuals for that matter.  On the other hand, 
setting the movement speed too high will cause entities to 
“jump” ahead several grids in a single time step with the 
effect being that they pass through walls or go undetected 
by other agents.  This we did not want so we considered our 
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movement speeds very thoroughly and chose parameter values 
which would not allow for this possibility. 
D. OUR URBAN, HA/DR SCENARIO SETUP IN MANA 
This section will provide a detailed description of 
our scenario and then explicate the specifics of each 
squad.  Appendix B provides a comprehensive listing of the 
parameters, how they are manipulated within MANA, and what 
we believe they represent in the “real world”.  
Furthermore, the appendix provides justification for the 
ranges we chose for each of these factors.  While reading 
through this model description, we suggest the reader refer 
to Appendix B as well. 
The scenario, shown in Figure 3, depicts a convoy 
operating in an urban environment.  The convoy follows a 
given route to the southern HA site where they distribute 
food to neutrals who have made their way to that site.  The 
simulation runs for 1000 time steps and we do not vary this 
in any of our runs.  Each run begins slightly differently 
because of the random placement of squads within a defined 
border at the start of the run.  These random starting 
locations are reset each run.  Figure 3 shows the scenario 




Figure 3.   Beginning of a Run. 
 
In Figure 4 Blue agents, representing a convoy of 
Marines (or a relief agency with a Marine security escort), 
drive across the top of the screen until they come to their 
first waypoint, represented by a blue flag.  They make a 
left-hand turn and continue south.  The yellow agents are 
neutrals.  The northern neutrals are making their way to 
the HA site closest to them, represented by the yellow flag 
in the center of the upper screen.  Concurrently, southern 
neutrals move towards the southern HA site.  The red agent 
is searching for the convoy and intends to fire at the 
Marines and then quickly run away.  Figure 4 depicts the 
action of the aggressor. 
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Figure 4.   Convoy passes northern neutrals; they begin to 
chase.  Aggressor takes a shot at the convoy. 
 
If the trucks pass within the northern neutrals threat 
influence ring they will speed up and try to follow the 
trucks.  As the convoy is passing by, the red agent will 
take a shot and then try to run away.  If the security 
element can identify the aggressor it will return fire.  
The convoy’s response will be to speed up and drive out of 
the area.  The convoy will eventually make their way to the 
southern HA site and begin feeding the neutrals.  This is 




Figure 5.   The convoy feeds neutrals at the southern HA 
site. 
 
In the next section we will step through the process 
of how we built our squads in MANA.  We have five squads: a 
convoy of four trucks; the security attachment, a single 
vehicle; 35 northern neutrals; 35 southern neutrals; and 
the red agent. 
1. Squad General Properties Tab 
Creating a squad in MANA begins on the squad general 
properties tab (see Figure 6).  Here we name the squad, set 
the number of agents in the squad, establish the starting 
position, place the waypoints the squad will follow, and 
set up features relating to how the squad will appear on 




Figure 6.   Sample Squad General Properties Tab 
 
We establish starting points by first drawing a 
starting box.  Next, we specify the (x, y) coordinates of 
the center of that box and define the height and width.  
Agents are then randomly placed anywhere within the box at 
the start of each run.  In our model we set up two such 
boxes; one in the upper half of the screen and the other in 
the lower half.  Our northern and southern neutrals begin 
each run in those boxes respectively.  The aggressor agent 
has the run of the entire screen as a starting location.  
Right at the start of the scenario we have introduced 
random starting locations for the neutral agents and 
believe this effectively describes our urban scenario. 
The convoy always starts in the upper right-hand 
corner and follows a prescribed route to the southern HA 
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site.  Marine Corps doctrine requires the Convoy Commander 
to plan the convoy route prior to stepping off.  
Predetermining the route allows leaders to plan for actions 
to be taken at choke points, rehearse timing, plan on-call 
targets, coordinate communication signals, and determine 
appropriate road march and catch up speeds.  Setting 
waypoints in our scenario is akin to determining the convoy 
route.  The only other waypoints used were set at each of 
the HA sites as a means of attracting the neutrals to these 
sites. 
There are two other points to make about the Squad 
General Properties Tab.  First, the comms delay parameter 
allows the modeler to dictate the number of time steps it 
takes before enemy detections appear on the SA map.  This 
represents a delay in processing and communicating incoming 
information.  Because we set our scenario in an urban 
environment we considered communications as simply word-of-
mouth.  As such, communication would be imprecise and slow, 
relative to a defined communications network.  On the other 
hand, there were a large number of neutrals posting 
information to the SA map so we did not think this 
parameter would make much difference after the initial 
sightings.  To test all of the possibilities we varied the 
length of time until postings widely. 
The second feature to draw attention to is the means 
in which MANA combines information.  The HQ squad 
identifier indicates the hierarchy among squads.  All 
squads of the same allegiance with the same HQ squad share 
the same SA map.  This allowed us to align the red agent 
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with the mass of neutrals.  We wanted to get at the idea 
that the aggressor could easily blend in with the crowd. 
2.  Squad Personality Properties Tab 
The personality properties tab is where we set the 
personality weightings that drive automata toward or away 
from goals, friendlies, or enemies.  The other basic 
feature on this tab is the move constraint settings that 
modify movement propensities by restricting or constricting 
them.  Figure 7 captures this tab and Table 1 describes the 
weightings in more detail. 
 
 






Description Controls propensity to move toward/away from 
Alive Friendlies Agents of same allegiance within sensor range 
Injured Friendlies Injured agents of same allegiance within sensor 
range 
Alive Enemies Agents of enemy allegiance within sensor range 
Alive Neutrals Agents of neutral allegiance within sensor range 
Next Waypoint The next waypoint agent's squad has been assigned 
Alternate Waypoint The alternate waypoint agent's squad has been 
assigned 
Easy Going Areas with easy going within 5 pixels of agent 
Cover Areas with protection from fire within 5 pixels of 
agent 
Concealment Areas which improve stealth within 5 pixels of 
agent 
Enemy Threat 1 Enemies in SA map which are of Threat Level 1 
Enemy Threat 2 Enemies in SA map which are of Threat Level 2 
Enemy Threat 3 Enemies in SA map which are of Threat Level 3 
Distant Friends Agents of same allegiance anywhere on map 
Center Line The center line (defined as line between the 
current and immediately past goal) 
Table 1.   Squad personality weighting variables. 
 
We have modeled the convoy with weights that pull them 
toward their waypoints and toward one another.  After many, 
many hours of experimentation, we discovered these two 
factors provided the most control for getting the convoy to 
accomplish its mission.  In our full model we varied the 
weights of these two parameters in order to indicate 
differing levels of unit cohesion and discipline.  
Additionally, we were interested in seeing what would 
happen if we strengthened their attraction to injured 
members of the squad. 
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The neutrals on the other hand were much more loosely 
weighted.  We generally wanted them to go toward the HA 
site and prefer to stay together but neither of these 
weightings was particularly strong.  The northern neutrals’ 
desire to chase the convoy was accomplished by increasing 
their attraction to the convoy and zeroing out their 
impetus toward the northern HA site once contact was made.  
Initial runs provided the range of values we studied in our 
full model. 
The aggressor agent had, as his main objective, the 
convoy.  Depending on whether he had taken a shot or not, 
he was drawn toward the trucks or repelled from them.  
Before the shot we had him seek out the convoy.  Once the 
red agent had fired, his weighting changed to a negative 
value, the result being that he “ran away.”  Additionally, 
the aggressor wanted to hide among friends, accomplished by 
an attraction toward friends weighting, and opted for easy 
terrain, cover, and concealment when fleeing. 
Next we will treat the minimum distance and movement 
constraints.  These provide modifiers on the personality 
weightings.  For example, the min distance to alive enemies 
variable limits the distance to which an agent will 
approach an enemy.  The value entered is the minimum 
distance the agent will try to maintain in terms of number 
of cells.  We did not use any minimum distance settings in 
our scenario. 
The constraints come in three types.  The cluster 
constraint is intended to prevent the build up of clusters 
of friendly entities above a certain size, determined by 
the value of this parameter.  Combat constraints prevent a 
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squad from advancing on an enemy without a numerical 
advantage.  MANA counts the numbers on each side within 
sensor range, than compares the two numbers.  For example, 
a value of 5, input here for a blue squad, means there must 
be 5 more blue agents than red before blue will advance.  
Finally, the advance constraint works in the same way to 
prevent a squad from advancing toward its next waypoint 
without a sufficient number.  We did not invoke any of the 
constraint parameters. 
3. Squad Range Properties Tab 
The squad range properties tab, Figure 8, is divided 
into the following four sections: general information about 
the squad; sensor range; fuel information; and parameters 
controlling enemy interactions. 
 
Figure 8.   Sample Squad Range Properties Tab 
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The general information lets the user select an icon 
for the squad, assign its allegiance, establish the threat 
level which will appear on an enemy SA map for that squad, 
specify the squad’s movement speed, and dictate how close 
the squad must come to its waypoints.  We will dwell on the 
movement speed briefly.  We felt from the very beginning 
the convoy’s speed should be no more than four times the 
speed of the neutrals.  This was partly based on real world 
assumptions and partly on MANA peculiarities explained in 
the next paragraph. 
We wanted to encourage the northern neutrals to chase 
the convoy.  After all, the intent was to feed as many 
neutrals as possible.  We began with the assumption the 
average walking speed of the neutrals should be around 3 
mph based on the author’s Marine Corps experience where we 
set our march rate at between 2.5 and 3 mph.  Since there 
is no way to explicitly code 3 mph we made the neutral 
speed and convoy speeds relative to one another.  So 
through our judgment we set the convoy speed at 4 times the 
northern neutrals’ walking speed and made variations around 
these starting values. 
The other oddity we needed to work around was the 
number of time steps used in the scenario.  The faster we 
set the speed of the convoy, the quicker they reached the 
HA site and shut down while they conducted feeding 
operations.  It would not do to have the convoy reach the 
HA site within 10 time steps, for example, and then sit 
there for another 990.  So we needed to choose a range of 
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speeds that made sense and did not require us to change the 
run time for different speeds. 
Continuing on with the squad range properties tab, the 
fuel variables attracted much of our time and effort during 
the initial setup as we searched for a way to directly 
measure logistics support.  The variables were fuel tank, 
the amount of fuel with which an automata begins the run; 
fuel rate, the amount of fuel consumed per time step; 
refuel trigger range, within this distance an entity may be 
refueled; and probability to refuel neutrals, friends, or 
enemies, the probability that one of these agents, within 
the refuel trigger range, will be refueled.  Our preferred 
choice for an MOE would have been to use these parameters 
as a means of measuring food distribution more specifically 
and more accurately.  We intended to begin the scenario 
with each neutral having a set amount of “food” and would 
have decremented that food with each time step.  We would 
have then set the probability to refuel neutral parameter 
in such a way as to cause the convoy to pass food to the 
neutrals.  This would have allowed us to measure the amount 
of food delivered relative to the need.  After many hours 
of work in an earlier version of MANA we were unable to set 
this up.  The current version of MANA allows a form of this 
but we have not gone back to reset our scenario.  This type 
of analysis will be one of our recommendations for further 
work. 
Now we discuss the enemy interaction set of 
parameters.  Stealth is intended to represent how difficult 
it is to see an entity once it is within an enemy’s sensor 
range.  The red agent invokes this factor after taking a 
 50
shot at the convoy.  We varied the number of hits to kill 
parameter in order to model various types of armor 
protection on the convoy.  If this factor is set to any 
number greater than one, the model labels an entity 
sustaining the first hit as injured thereafter. 
Max targets per step is the number of targets within 
sensor and firing range that can be engaged per time step, 
divided by 100.  Dividing the number allows for fractions 
of targets and works in the same way that movement speed is 
calculated.  So a 150 setting means that one target is 
engaged with 100% probability and a second target is 
engaged 50% of the time.  We used this variable to model 
the type of weapon the red agent carried; single shot or 
automatic.  The aggressor’s firepower value, or single shot 
kill probability (SSKP) was varied over the entirety of the 
range.  We reasoned that he could choose the time and place 
of his shot on the one hand but, on the other hand, his 
shots would be poorly aimed.  The Marine’s return fire was 
considered to be fairly inaccurate though because they 
would be reacting instinctively, without complete 
information on the source of the shot, and while trying to 
drive out of the kill zone. 
We considered varying the firing range factor but, in 
the end, thought that realistically the canalizing effect 
of the streets, as well as the built up nature of urban 
terrain would limit the effective range of any type of 
weapon to the line of sight range of the shooter.  
Therefore, we set all weapons’ ranges and did not change 
them throughout the runs. 
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Finally, we wanted to model the differences that 
different types of weapons would have on mission success.  
What would be the difference if the red agent carried a 
rocket propelled grenade versus an AK-47.  The shot radius 
variable sets the radius of the SSKP.  Shot radius then 
allowed the introduction of area fire weapons in addition 
to point direct weapons.  It should be noted that an agent 
will not fire an area fire weapon unless that agent is 
outside of the range of the blast radius.  However, if the 
weapon is fired, friendlies may be injured just the same as 
enemy agents. 
4. Squad Movement Tab 
The final tab is the squad movement tab, Figure 9, 
which allows the analyst to choose between movement 
algorithms, set the degree of randomness when moving, and 
dictate squad movement characteristics.  As indicated 
earlier, we uncovered a problem with the move precision 
parameter.  Move precision sets the degree of random motion 
when choosing a move.  When we set the factor to zero in 
batch mode we broke something in MANA, as yet unknown. 
Navigate obstacles will make entities in the squad 
try-and find their way around solid obstacles when they get 
“stuck.”  Squad moves together means the fractional 
movement for each squad member is the same at each time 
step.  Going affects speed means entities will decrease 
their movement speed with regard to the type of terrain 
they are in.  As you can see, these are check boxes and we 




Figure 9.   Sample Squad Movement Properties Tab. 
5. Trigger States 
 
Trigger states, shown in Figure 10, are a way to 
change the properties of a squad in the middle of a run 
based on the occurrence of some event.  All entities start 
in the default state, and remain in that state until a 
triggering event occurs.  Triggering events may change the 
behavior of the particular agent involved in the event or 
may change the behavior of the entire squad that that agent 
belongs to.  Once activated by the causal event, the 
agent’s behavior will change in a way, and for a duration, 
specified by the modeler.  For example, in its default 
state the red agent wants to move towards the convoy.  We 
used the taken shot trigger to change his behavior to 
“running away” from the convoy. 
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Figure 10.   Sample Trigger States in MANA. 
 
Duration is the number of time steps a squad or agent 
will remain in that trigger state.  The fallback to option 
indicates what state the agent will fallback to when the 
specified number of time steps has expired. 
Beginning with the convoy, we invoked two trigger 
states in addition to the default state.  First, we 
increased the convoy’s speed and desire to move away from 
an enemy when the squad shot at trigger was activated.  
This is in line with Marine Corps doctrine when caught in a 
near ambush.  Secondly, when the convoy reaches the 
southern HA site, triggering the reach final waypoint 
state, their movement speed is set to zero and they 
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recognize the neutrals as enemies which has the effect of 
causing the convoy to begin firing HDRs at them. 
The northern neutrals’ single trigger was seeing or 
hearing of the presence of the convoy; enemy contact, 
communicated through the SA map.  This event caused them to 
forgo their initial desire to make their way to the 
northern HA site and, instead increase their speed and 
desire to follow after the trucks.  We believe this 
accurately describes how crowd movement patterns might look 
in a real world HA/DR operation. 
Two trigger states were concatenated together to 
portray the aggressor’s actions after taking a shot.  
First, he enters the taken shot state for a single time 
step.  This is simply a MANA trace-back application trick 
to allow us to determine what happened when those actions 
occurred.  Next, red falls into the retreat state while he 
flees from the convoy.  We did not intend for this to be a 
combat model but did want to introduce the idea of 
harassing fire and believed the single red agent was the 
best way to inculcate that construct. 
This chapter, along with Appendix B, completes the 
details of the setup of our model in MANA.  We believe that 
between the combination of the default squad weightings, 
the trigger states, and the parameter settings that they 
invoke, we have a good distillation of the HA/DR scenario 
we desired.  We also believe that this model is general 
enough to allow for a number of different extrapolations.  
For example, the convoy could easily be copied and 
reintroduced as a second convoy tasked with feeding a 
second site.  Similarly, we could increase the number of 
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red agents to test the construct of a more hostile 
populace.  Coordination between neutrals could be tested by 
strengthening their attraction to one another, by setting 
their movements to be more precise, or by manipulation of 
SA map settings. 
The next chapter explains the Latin Hypercube design 
used establish parameter settings in our experiment.  Next 
we consider the statistical tests we used to fit equations 
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IV. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
Without data and information there can be no 
monitoring.  Disaster data are numbers that 
matter. 
Christopher Black 
International Federation of the Red Cross, 1997 
 
A.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
We present our analysis methodology in three parts.  
Section B devolves how we designed our experiment.  In this 
discussion we plainly identify the 40 squad/state/factor 
combinations, described in Chapter III, we chose to include 
in our experiment.  Secondly, the process of designing a 
Latin Hypercube (LHC) is explained as we applied the 
technique to our combinations.  In Section C the 
statistical software package we used for our analysis is 
introduced.  The final division (Section D) explains the 
principals behind the additive multiple regression model we 
fit to our dataset, as well as, the underlying assumptions 
necessary for the regression technique to be valid.  
Finally, the statistical tests used to compare various 
regression models and to identify significant 
squad/state/factor combinations are explained. 
B.  DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
We now highlight three topics; the selection of factor 
combinations for the experiment, an explanation of the 
experimental design used to generate squad/state/factor 
combination settings, and the supercomputing process that 




1. Squad/State/Factor Combinations and Their Ranges 
Because it is possible in MANA to vary the parameters 
of any squad, in any state, the number of combinations can 
grow almost without bounds.  We used thousands of 
exploratory MANA runs to bound the combinations we wanted 
to test.  For example, we wanted to find the effect that 
the number of hits to kill parameter had on the number fed.  
We reasoned if a truck were killed, fewer neutrals would be 
fed.  But it was not necessary to vary this parameter when 
the convoy entered the shot at state because the red agent 
would be running away at that point.  A full factorial 
design was not needed.  Instead, squad/state/factor 
combinations were selected based on an understanding of the 
problem.  In the end, we found 40 combinations we thought 
should impact the number of neutrals fed. 
Table 2 lists the 40 combinations explored and the 
ranges we chose to vary.  The ranges were also determined 
through trial and error during the thousands of exploratory 
runs.  The naming convention we used was 
squad_state_factor.  In some cases the parameter value is 
set at the outset of a run and is not identified with a 
particular state, but rather is carried throughout the run.  
In this case the naming convention is squad_factor; see for 
example southern neutrals_ThreatRate in the table. 
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squad state parameter low high
Convoy ThreatRate 1 500
Default State Alive Friends 50 100
Next Waypoint 80 100
Movement Speed 50 200
No. of Hits Required to Kill 1 3
Min Distance to Friends 3 15
Squad Shot At State Alive Friends 50 100
Alive Enemy -100 -50
Injured Friends -25 25
SA Threat 3 (High) -100 -50
Reach Final Waypoint State Max Targets Per Step 80 120
southern neutrals ThreatRate 1 500
CommsDelay 0 500
Precision 0 500
Default State Next Waypoint 60 80
Security ThreatRate 1 500
Default State Next Waypoint 80 100
Movement Speed 50 200
No. of Hits Required to Kill 1 3




Default State Next Waypoint 60 80
Sensor Range 5 100
Contact State Alive Friends 0 50
Alive Enemy 50 100
SA Threat 3 (High) 50 100
Sensor Range 5 100
Aggressor ThreatRate 1 500
ThreatSize 5 100
Precision 0 500
Default State SSKP 0 100
Alive Enemy 50 100
SA Threat 3 (High) 50 100
Sensor Range 5 100
Max Targets Per Step 100 300
Shot Radius 1 30
Retreat State Alive Enemy -100 -50
SA Threat 3 (High) -100 -50
 
Table 2.   Squad_state_factor combinations and their 
ranges used in the design of experiments. 
 
2. Latin Hypercube (LHC) 
Obviously we could not have conducted any type of full 
or even fractional factorial experiment.  If, for example, 
we had looked at our 40 combinations at even two levels 
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each, we would have begun with 402  design points requiring 
121.0995 10x  runs to obtain even one data point for each of the 
possible combinations.  On top of that, if we then 
considered running the experiment numerous times at each 
design point, varying the seed each time, the amount of 
time it would have taken to run our simulation would have 
risen exponentially.  A three level experiment, enabling us 
to detect non-linearities, was right out. 
So then we turned to the LHC design.  A LHC is a 
sampling technique whereby all portions of the distribution 
of the range of a factor are divided into strata of equal 
marginal probability.  The LHC then samples once, at random 
from within one of the strata.  The value drawn is then 
assigned as the factor setting for the first run of the 
simulation.  This technique is then repeated without 
replacement for the second, third, and all subsequent runs.  
So by the end of the LHC process the distribution of 
possible values for that factor have been uniformly sampled 
resulting in a column filled with randomly sampled and 
randomly assigned factor settings that cover the number of 
simulation runs [TRAC-Monterey, 2003 and Cioppa, 2002].  
When the technique is applied to all factors the result is 
a square matrix with sides equal in length to the number of 
factors. 
We used the java code given in Appendix C and written 
by Professors Susan and Paul Sanchez to select settings for 
our LHC.  The input to the ReadFactors class is a three-
column spreadsheet.  The first column is the factor name.  
Columns two and three are the low and high settings, 
respectively, for that factor.  ReadFactors calls the 
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LatinHypercube class and passes it the spreadsheet 
information.  Class LatinHypercube actually generates the 
LHC.  Precautions were built in to deal with the case where 
the factor range was less than the number of factors. 
If, for example, the factor only had three settings 
but the designer wanted to include 30 factors, the code 
would try to divide the range of that three-settings 
parameter into as many bins as possible and then select 
equally from each bin until the factor’s column in the LHC 
was full.  The result would be approximately 10 of each of 
the settings randomly assigned throughout the LHC. 
With a LHC design one wants to limit the incidence of 
multicollinearity or correlation between the columns.  The 
very fact that values within each column are chosen at 
random is, in itself, a guard against confounding but it is 
still possible for correlation to enter into this design 
nonetheless.  In order to try to minimize the chance of 
multicollinearity occurring in our design, we strung 16 
LHCs together.  By concatenating 16 LHCs, each of which had 
randomly generated columns, the chance of any two columns 
being correlated was much less than would have been the 
case in a smaller design.  This was a simple process 
because the java code allowed us to specify how many LHCs 
we desired to be concatenated together. 
Our design process followed the protocol just 
described.  Initially we started with four LHCs appended 
together to avoid the problem of multicollinearity.  After 
our first run we had a 160 x 40 matrix.  A correlation 
matrix of the results showed that in several cases we had 
correlation between columns which was greater than 0.20  or 
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less than 0.20− .  The highest correlation was around 0.27± , 
and the average correlation magnitude was 0.063.  We wanted 
to force more of this correlation out of our design so we 
eventually strung 16 LHCs together for a total design space 
of 640 x 40.  This gave us 640 different combinations of 
settings for our 40 squad/state/factors.  We were confident 
our design was sufficient to cover the range of possible 
outcomes and were pleased with a final correlation of not 
more than 0.14±  with an average magnitude of 0.031. 
3. Supercomputing 
PA has established a web-based interface where 
modelers may submit their agent-based files for runs on the 
supercomputing clusters at the Maui High-Performance 
Computing Center (MHPCC).  Using this resource simply 
requires one to submit the xml file and bitmap, and then 
define the variables to be farmed over, along with the 
ranges and step size for each of those variables. 
In our case, because we were not using standard step 
sizes to fill out our ranges, we conferred directly with 
the MITRE Corporation, the principal contractor supporting 
the Marine Corps’ efforts.  Our LHC design required MITRE 
to write a front-end script that would strip off row values 
from our spreadsheet and insert them into the xml file.  
They then farmed the runs over a supercomputing cluster and 
ran each set of design points 50 times, varying the seed 
with each run.  With 640 design settings and 50 
replications at each row they completed 32,000 runs in 7 ½ 
hours.  The results were returned to us in the form of a 




C. DATA ANALYSIS 
In this section we introduce the software package we 
used to analyze that data.  Next, we relate why we chose to 
consolidate our data prior to beginning our analysis. 
1. JMP Statistical Discovery Software™ 
To begin looking at the dataset, we needed to find a 
data analysis package that was easy to use and which had 
well-developed graphics capabilities.  We felt the graphics 
capability was especially important because of the need to 
effectively view the breadth of the sample space.  We could 
have used several different sets of software and migrated 
the results from one to another but opted instead, to look 
until we found a system offering one-stop-shopping.  The 
JMP Statistical Discovery Software™ package met our needs. 
JMP is a product of The SAS Institute® and is 
advertised as a software package for interactive 
statistical graphics [JMP, 2002].  JMP includes: 
• A spreadsheet for viewing, editing, entering, and 
manipulating data. 
• A broad range of graphical and statistical 
methods for data analysis. 
• Options to select and display subsets of the 
data. 
• Facility for grouping data and computing summary 
statistics. 
The software is designed to be a point-and-click 
product made for the field analyst.  We found this software 
easy to learn and use. 
2. Data Rollup 
We began our regression model fitting efforts with the 
full dataset, 32,000 points.  Because we had so many data 
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points, it was hard to determine if a particular outcome 
was the result of the true characteristics of a variable or 
simply due to the natural variability of that factor.  We 
decided we would average the results of the 50 iterations 
at each set of design points.  We used the mean of the 
consolidation as the result for that particular set of 
runs.  This technique also allowed us to invoke the Central 
Limit Theorem. 
D. ADDITIVE MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
While there are many analysis techniques that could 
have been applied to our dataset, we concentrated primarily 
on additive multiple linear regression.  We wanted to drill 
deeply into understanding the effect our 40 combinations of 
squad/state/factor had on mission success.  This included 
trying to quantify that effect to a limited degree but, 
more importantly, involved finding a robust set of 
parameters which would be effective over a wider range of 
scenarios. 
Additionally, we hoped to determine what the 
combination suggested in terms of real world outcomes.  If, 
for example, convoy speed turned out to be statistically 
significant, what were the training, tactics, and 
techniques ramifications?  We felt this was an area of high 
contribution stemming from our research. 
Regression is a standard technique that quantifies how 
a response variable is perturbed by various predictors.  
Mostly, we used linear regression, the application of 
regression techniques to a continuous response.  In some 
cases we treated individual inputs as ordinal in order to 
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track specific effects of interest.  We considered only 
main effects, 2nd degree polynomials and 2-way interactions. 
1. The Regression Technique 
The regression technique fits a linear function line 
(or set of hyperplanes in the case of multidimensional 
input data) using the least squares fitting criterion; 
minimizing the sums squared error on a set of continuous, 
categorical, or independent variables.  A random error term 
( ε ) is included so the general additive multiple regression 
model looks like this: 
0 1 1 2 2 k kY x x xβ β β β ε= + + + + +" , where 
Y is the dependent variable, 
the x’s are the independent variables, 
iβ  is the coefficient of the independent variable with 
i  = 1,…,k, and 
ε  is a random error term. 
2. Assumptions 
The following assumptions regarding ε  must hold for 
the regression fitting technique and the statistical 
testing procedures (t-tests and F tests) to be a valid 
[Devore, 2000 and Hamilton, 1992]. 
• Errors must follow a normal (Gaussian) 
distribution. 
• The errors must be identically distributed with 
zero mean and constant variance. 
• All errors must be independent and identically 
distributed (iid). 
3. Comparing Regression Models 
We used the coefficient of determination, or 2R , as 
our principal measure of best fit when deciding between 
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regression models.  The 2R  value estimates the proportion 
of the variation in the response around the mean which can 
be attributed to terms in the model rather than to random 
error [JMP, 2002].  So an 2R  of 1.0 means the response is 
completely predictable based on the value of the 
independent variables.  An 2R  of 0.0, on the other hand, 
means the fit predicts the response no better than the 
overall mean would.  Because 2R  will never decrease as more 
variables are added, we were not interested in a model that 
maximized 2R
.  Instead we wanted to find a simple 
regression model, one with the fewest number of factors, 
for which 2R  was nearly as large as the 2R  of a “full” 
model which included all 40 squad/state/factor 
combinations.  2R  is calculated: 
2 1 SSER
SST
= − , where 
2 2
0 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ( ) [ ( )]i j j j k kjSSE y y y x xβ β β= − = − + + +∑ ∑ "  
and 
2( )iSST y y= −∑  
we refer to SSE  as Sum Squared Errors and SST  as Sum 
Squared Total. 
Our second comparison measure between models was the F 
statistic, also known as the model utility test.  If l  is 
the number of terms in our original regression model and k  
is the number of terms in a model including the original 
terms plus interactions, than the F test involves the null 
hypothesis 0 1 2: 0l l kH β β β+ += = = =" , according to which there is 
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no useful relationship between Y and any of the k 
predictors.  If, however, at least one of these 'sβ  is not 
0, the corresponding predictor(s) are useful.  The test is 
based on a statistic having an F distribution when 0H  is 
true as defined by: 










where kSSE  is the unexplained variation for of the 
regression model having k  terms and lSSE  is the unexplained 
variation of the reduced model [Devore, 2000]. 
4. Plotting the Regression Models 
Once we were satisfied with our choice of a regression 
model, we used two plots as a quick validation of the 
goodness of fit of that model.  First, we plotted the 
actual number fed vs. the predicted number fed in order to 
visually check the fit of our prediction line.  This 
technique serves as an easy and immediate way to visually 
ensure predictions follow the general pattern of the actual 
dependent variable.  In the actuals vs. predicted plot we 
hoped to see our points lining up diagonally, beginning at 
the origin and following a slope of one.  If the 
predictions were perfect, they would have lain entirely 
over the top of the actual number fed at each data point in 
our dataset.  See Figure 11 as an example.  This type of 
pattern would have visually indicated that our estimated 
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Figure 11.   Sample of actual vs. predicted plot. 
 
A second quick-look plot we used was the standardized 
residuals vs. the predicted number fed plot.  Residuals are 
the difference between the actual number fed and the 
predicted number fed.  In this plot we hoped to see the 
points evenly spaced and distributed throughout the frame, 
as in Figure 12.  In other words, we did not want to be 
able to detect any pattern.  A pattern would violate the 
assumption that errors were independently distributed with 
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Figure 12.   Sample residuals vs. predicted plot. 
 
5. Determining the Significance of Terms in the 
Regression Model 
The final step in fully accepting the specific 
combinations of factors themselves was to test them both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.  Qualitatively, the 
author’s judgment was relied upon to determine whether the 
inclusion or exclusion of a specific squad/state/factor 
combination made sense.  For example, in the opinion of the 
author, should the movement speed of the convoy be included 
as a factor in predicting the number of neutrals fed in our 
scenario?  Or, should the sign of the threat rate parameter 
be negative?  This would mean the greater the distance at 
which neutrals begin to chase the fewer the number fed. 
The quantitative tests used to examine factors and 
factor combinations were the student t-test and the Tukey 
test [Devore, 2000].  In order to determine the 
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significance of a particular term in the regression model, 
we used the t statistic and its corresponding p-value.  The 
t statistic is the ratio of the parameter estimate to its 







= , where 
T is the test statistic, 
ˆ
iβ  is the estimation of the true value of the 
coefficient on the independent variable ix , with i = 1,…,k, 
iβ  is the true value of the coefficient on the 
independent variable ix , with i = 1,…,k, and 
ˆ
i
Sβ  is the standard error of 
ˆ
iβ . 
Looking for a t-ratio greater than 2 in absolute value 
is a common rule of thumb for judging significance because 
it approximates the α  = 0.05 level of significance.  α  is 
the probability of rejecting a true hypothesis about our 
experiment [Devore, 2000]. 
The Tukey test uses the Studentized range distribution 
and depends on two parameters, a numerator degrees of 
freedom (df), m, and a denominator df, v.  Let , ,m vQα  denote 
the upper-tail α  critical value of the Studentized range 
distribution with m numerator df and v denominator df.  
Values of the Studentized random variable can be found in 
tables given in Devore, 2000.  , , ( 1)I I JQα −  can be used to find 
simultaneous confidence intervals for all pairwise 
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differences [ ] [ ]i jE y E y− .  We can then say with probability 
1 α− , 
, , ( 1) , , ( 1)/ [ ] [ ] /i j I I J i j i j I I Jx x Q MSE J E y E y x x Q MSE Jα α⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ −− − ≤ − ≤ − +  
for every i and j.  Each interval which does not include 
zero yields the conclusion [ ]iE y  and [ ]jE y  differ 
significantly at the level α .  The typical sequence of 
steps simplifying this procedure is as follows: 
1.  Select α  and find , , ( 1)I I JQα −  from a table such as in 
Devore. 
2.  Determine , , ( 1) /I I Jw Q MSE Jα −= i . 
3.  List the sample means in increasing order and 
underline those pairs differing by less than w.  Any pair 
of sample means not underscored by the same line 
corresponds to a pair of means that are judged to be 
significantly different. 
In JMP this procedure is automated and thus it is very 
easy to test over the range of a particular factor to see 
where, within that range, the settings group together and 
hence are not significantly different.  An additional 
benefit of this test in JMP is the JMP output.  JMP 
automatically creates what it calls the means diamonds 
plot.  The plot clearly shows the spread of the number fed 
at each setting of the parameter.  Furthermore, the means 
diamonds plot reveals the trend in the number fed as the 
parameter takes on the range of its values.  When coupled 
with the Students t-test and the Tukey test, the plot 
identifies the significant difference between factor 
settings. 
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In this chapter we have laid out the methodology we 
followed to generate, process, and fit our data.  Chapter V 
explains in much greater detail the process of fitting our 
regression models to our full dataset.  We then defend 
these models and present summary statistics and interesting 
findings.  We look at specific parameters of interest and 
several interactions.  Throughout the chapter we highlight 
the operational insights gained from the results. 
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V. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to 
reality, they are not certain; and as far as they 
are certain, they do not refer to reality. 
Albert Einstein (1879 - 1955) 
 
If scientific reasoning were limited to the 
logical processes of arithmetic, we should not 
get very far in our understanding of the physical 
world. One might as well attempt to grasp the 
game of poker entirely by the use of the 
mathematics of probability. 
Vannevar Bush (1890 - 1974) 
Pivotal figure in hypertext research 
 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter details the iterative process we used to 
fit our final regression model.  After examining the signs 
of the coefficients on the main effects and the resulting 
2-way interactions, we present summary statistics and 
conclusions based on this model.  We identify the 
squad/state/factor combinations found to be important and 
suggest how these combinations may be exploited during 
future operations.  Finally, we cover follow-on regression 
models we explored as a result of our findings when we fit 
the final model. 
B. FITTING THE MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL 
In this section we build our final linear model.  The 
process followed to generate this regression model is 
explained and the underlying assumptions of the model are 
checked.  Several main effects and interactions are tested 
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or examined more closely.  Finally, we present the results 
and suggest interpretations. 
1. Fitting the Main-Effects-Only Model 
To begin fitting the main effects of our original 40 
combinations, we started with no terms in the model and 
used the forward stepwise regression procedure in JMP to 
add terms.  A factor combination was initially included in 
the regression model if its p-value was less than 0.25.  
The initial selection found 23 squad/state/factor 
combinations out of the original 40 met the criteria.  The 
2R  associated with this equation was 0.6041.  Before 
looking more closely at the terms which survived the 
initial screening as described in Chapter 4, we considered 
the effect of striking those terms that had been factored 
out by our stepwise regression process. 
Three groups of factors surfaced as not being 
important in predicting the number fed in our simulation.  
Based on the thousands of runs made in the months prior to 
designing our full experiment, we had targeted the 
cohesiveness of the convoy, the movement of the red agent, 
and the interactions between the convoy and the aggressor 
as three of the areas we wanted to study.  Almost all of 
the 17 factor combinations not included in the first cut 
fell into one of these categories.  We then set out to 
determine why these parameters were excluded. 
Terms such as the convoy’s propensity to move toward 
its waypoints, alive or injured friends, or toward its 
enemies were included in our setup and were meant to 
measure cohesiveness.  In our analysis these factor 
combinations were not significant.  We found a ready 
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explanation.  These parameters were highly dependent on the 
benign environment we had created.  The convoy’s 
cohesiveness was never fully tested in our setup, in part 
because the momentum of the convoy and their programmed 
immediate action drills simply propelled them toward their 
final goal, feeding neutrals.  Furthermore, the aggressor’s 
actions of shooting and running away did not have a 
significant effect on the pursuit of the convoy by the 
northern neutrals. 
The same reasoning helped to explain the non-effect of 
the red agent’s movement and his interactions with the 
convoy.  We thought the aggressiveness of the enemy agent 
(his propensity to move toward the convoy) would impact the 
number fed.  After fitting our model we determined the 
movement pattern of the aggressor, while it may have been 
significant if we were measuring something besides the 
number of neutrals fed, did little to affect neutral or 
convoy movement. 
Likewise, terms such as the number of hits to kill the 
convoy or its propensity to move away from red, also were 
not significantly tested in our setup.  Rarely did the red 
agent ever actually kill a truck (an outcome that would 
have impacted the number fed) and the convoy’s response to 
the aggressor did not inhibit the number fed.  In fact, the 
response may have contributed to feeding more neutrals.  In 
the end, we were comfortable leaving these factors out of 
the fitted equation. 
Next, we wanted to continue to whittle down the number 
of squad/state/factor combinations while maintaining the 
explanatory power of the model.  Each variable with a p-
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value over 0.02 was individually removed from the equation 
while the p-values of the remaining combinations were 
checked to see what effect removing the variable had on the 
overall 2R .  This iterative process did not involve simply 
going from the top of the list to the bottom and removing 
factor combinations.  Instead we began with the largest p-
values and worked our way through the combinations.  In 
some cases this meant returning parameters to the equation 
that had previously been removed if their p-values dipped 
back below 0.02 as a result of some other factor 
combination being removed. 
By the time this process was finished, the Main-
Effects Model consisted of 11 squad/state/factor 
combinations and had an 2R  of 0.5824.  We had reduced the 
size of the regression model from 40 variables to 23 and 
then further reduced it to 11 variables.  This only reduced 
2R
 
by about 2 points.  With a core set of main effects, we 
now had the difficult job of justifying the inclusion of 
these factor combinations in our model.  To do this we 
began by considering the signs of the coefficients.  We 
address these problems in the next section but pause first 
to capture the benefit of our research to this point. 
There were two primary takeaways from this portion of 
our research.  First, we encountered for ourselves the 
trouble one has when trying to measure logistical 
effectiveness in an agent-based modeling environment.  We 
felt the variable combinations which emerged from our 
fitting process were closely tied to the way we had set up 
our simulation.  The setup of our simulation was driven in 
part by the MOE offered by the software (number of red/blue 
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killed).  Using a combat measure as a surrogate for 
measuring the number fed may have arbitrarily introduced 
error into our fitted model.  Since we began our research, 
MANA has implemented functionality which allows the modeler 
to use the refuel parameters to measure commodity rates. 
Calling attention to this limitation in PA’s suite of 
agent-based modeling platforms has already had an impact.  
This author was privileged to work with the developers of 
SOCRATES, an alternative agent-based modeling environment 
at a logistics workshop in December 2002.  The need to be 
able to explicitly model the retention, transfer, and 
consumption of resources was identified to the developers 
during this workshop.  They have quickly updated the 
program to include these functions.  While the SOCRATES 
model has nothing directly to do with this research, we 
believe we helped to “get the ball rolling” by identifying, 
in the early stages of our simulation setup, the need to 
model logistics explicitly. 
A second takeaway to this point is validation of the 
data farming process.  When we proposed this research, we 
identified we were setting up a highly interactive scenario 
with many possible factors and interactions.  What we had 
hoped for from the first step of our data farming process 
was to be able to cull the relevant factors out of the 40 
original parameters and still be able to account for much 
of the variability in our scenario.  This, in and of 
itself, would be a great benefit of our experiment for 
future decision makers given the complexity of the scenario 
and the number of factors we explored.  So we were very 
pleased with these initial results.  They proved the 
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utility of coupling agent-based simulations with smart 
experimental designs.  This process allowed us to quickly 
narrow the problem space in a highly complex scenario. 
2. Interpreting the Significant Squad/State/Factor 
Combinations 
We began interpreting our Main-Effects Model simply by 
considering the signs of the coefficients on each of the 
included main effects.  As an example, if we set the 
movement speed to high, we hypothesized fewer northern 
neutrals would be fed because the convoy would outrun them.  
An immediate way to check this theory was to ensure the 
sign of the coefficient on movement speed in our fitted 
model was negative.  The following list summarizes the 11 
main effects emerging from the stepwise regression, the 
signs we had expected for each of these main effects, and 
our reasoning behind these predictions. 
• convoy_default_speed – the faster the convoy 
traveled the less of a chance the pursuing 
northern neutrals would have had of maintaining 
contact.  Therefore, we predicted the sign would 
be negative. 
• security_default_speed – the same reasoning as 
convoy speed applies. 
• SN_comms delay – we expected a negative sign 
because the longer it took to post information to 
the SA map the more of a delay in acting on that 
information and therefore fewer should be fed. 
• NN_threat rate – this parameter should have 
produced a positive sign because the longer it 
took for sightings to degrade from the SA map, 
the more time was allowed for neutrals to act on 
that information. 
• NN_comms delay – we thought the opposite 
reasoning would apply to comms delay.  The longer 
it took to post a sighting to the SA map, the 
less time neutrals would have had to move toward 
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the convoy’s location.  This should have resulted 
in a negative sign on the coefficient. 
• NN_threat size - as the ring that induces a 
neutral’s actions became bigger, those actions 
occur earlier, resulting in more neutrals being 
fed.  We expected threat size to result in a 
positive sign. 
• NN_precision – the precision with which the 
neutrals moved should have resulted in more of 
them being fed.  Since, in MANA, a lower 
precision starting value causes more precise 
movement, it should also have led to a positive 
coefficient. 
• NN_default_sensor range – we reasoned the further 
away the neutrals could sense the convoy, the 
more opportunity they would have to chase it, 
resulting in a positive sign. 
• NN-contact_sensor range – the same argument holds 
for those neutrals that were in contact with the 
convoy.  In this context, a larger range 
facilitated maintaining contact and a positive 
sign would have resulted. 
• aggressor_precision – unlike the northern neutral 
precision, a less precise aggressor (a higher 
starting value) should have led to more neutrals 
being fed since the aggressor wanted to harass 
the convoy.  The sign should have been positive. 
• aggressor_default_SSKP – the aggressor’s kill 
probability, when higher, would have resulted in 
fewer neutrals being fed, hence a negative sign. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the main effects, the sign we 
hypothesized we would see, and the actual sign emerging 
when we fit the final regression model.  Areas of 




Squad/State/Factor Predicted sign Actual sign 
convoy_default_speed - - 
security_default_speed - - 
SN_comms delay - - 
NN_threat rate + - 
NN_threat size + - 
NN_comms delay - + 
NN_precision - - 
NN_default_sensor range + + 
NN_contact_sensor range + + 
aggressor_precision + - 
aggressor_default_SSKP - - 
aggressor_default_sensor range - - 
Table 3.   Predicted and actual signs of main effect 
coefficients. 
 
The fitted model returned some counterintuitive signs 
on the squad/state/factor coefficients.  The combinations 
we felt the need to further study and explain were 
NN_threat rate, NN_threat size, NN_comms delay, and 
aggressor_precision.  Considerable thought was given in 
order to explain the difference and decide whether to 
continue to include the term in our final model.  Here we 
present our conjectures as to why the signs were not what 
we expected. 
Whenever a neutral’s state was changed to enemy 
contact that neutral would then seek out threat level 3 
enemies using information posted to the SA map.  The threat 
rate measures the amount of time it takes before a posting 
to the SA map disappears.  It was not clear what the effect 
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of leaving sightings on the map would have.  On the one 
hand, with many neutrals posting sightings, there begins to 
be a clutter of observations on the map.  Furthermore, they 
appear in various places and last for various amounts of 
time.  Figure 13 shows this situation.  In the picture we 
see their have been several convoy sightings as the trucks 
made their way across the top of the scenario and passed 
the northern HA site.  It may be information of this type 
is just not useful to neutrals trying to pinpoint the 
location of the convoy.  On the other hand, if sightings 
disappear from the map almost as soon as they are posted, 
the information that does appear is always current, fresh 
information.  This may be more useful to neutrals when they 
attempt to target the convoy.  In this case, a lower threat 
rate starting value would result in more neutrals being fed 
and a negative sign on the coefficient.  In the end we were 
convinced by this reasoning and decided to leave the 
parameter in the model. 
 
Figure 13.   Northern Neutral’s SA map depicting many 
sightings as a result of a long threat rate. 
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Threat size indicates the size, in pixels, of the ring 
of action around an agent.  The agent will react to other 
agents who enter this ring.  Here we believed we had the 
possibility of intricate interactions emerging between this 
parameter and sensor range, line-of-sight, and relative 
movement speeds.  We thought it was possible we may have 
misjudged the emerging sign of this factor.  Furthermore, 
when we removed this main effect, the explained variation 
dropped by almost 10 points indicating the variable was 
indeed significant.  Northern neutral threat size was 
retained in the regression model. 
We found the coefficient for comms delay varied.  
Sometimes it was positive and sometimes it was negative 
depending on what model we fit.  In order to explain why, 
we made numerous individual runs specifically to test the 
comms delay parameter.  We found when we set the parameter 
to one (virtually no delay), sightings would post to the SA 
map immediately.  When we set it to 500, sightings would 
also post immediately.  No matter what experiment we 
attempted, the value of comms delay played no part in the 
way information was posted to the SA map.  We have yet to 
verify why this is and decided not to include this factor 
in our model. 
The simulation was set up so that if the aggressor 
entered the HA site he would opt to receive food rather 
than shoot at the convoy.  We believed this was a small 
point but a better depiction of reality.  We wanted the 
aggressor to act as if the convoy was more vulnerable while 
en route.  Once it reached the HA site, the red agent was 
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to consider it to dangerous to act aggressively.  The 
convoy would inevitably deploy its organic security element 
and possibly also have additional security at the site.  It 
was unclear to us at this point whether aggressor precision 
would always lead to a positive coefficient.  For this 
reason, we decided to leave this factor in the regression 
equation. 
After striking the southern neutral and northern 
neutral comms delay from the model, our final main effects 
regression model had nine terms and an 2R
 of 0.5304.  We 
next wanted to include main effects and their quadratic 
terms. 
3. Fitting the Quadratic Model 
Our next step was to add the quadratic effects 
beginning with the Main-Effects model.  JMP facilitated 
this simply by choosing the fit polynomial to degree 
command.  We began with the nine factor combinations that 
had survived the previous screening process.  We had 
determined ahead of time we would only include the squared 
term if the main effect was already in the regression 
equation.  After executing forward stepwise regression in 
JMP, the resulting model had 14 variables with a p-value 
less than or equal to 0.10, the number we had set as our 
cutoff value for entry into the equation.  The 2R  
associated with this model was 0.5829, so the five 
quadratic terms did capture some additional variation in 
the number of neutrals fed.  Before building the final 
regression model, we wanted to determine the number and 
type of interactions we might see so our next step involved 
removing the quadratic terms and fitting 2-way interactions 
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to see how well the model could explain the variability in 
number fed. 
4. Fitting the 2-way-Interactions Model 
Beginning with the nine factor Main-Effects model, we 
fit all the 2-way interactions as well.  Again, a main 
effect must have been in the model for its interaction with 
another term to appear as well.  Our technique at this 
stage was slightly different however.  Rather than using 
forward stepwise regression to add terms, we began with all 
the main effects and 2-way interaction terms initially in 
the regression equation and then cut out those that did not 
contribute significantly to predicting the dependent 
variable. 
By using this technique, we bounded our possible 
outcomes at either end.  In other words, we started fitting 
the Main-Effects model with no terms and then added factor 
combinations.  We started the 2-way interactions model with 
all possible terms and then removed combinations.  We felt 
the junction of these two techniques provided bounds for 
the best regression model.  The best equation, based on our 
judgment and statistical tests was somewhere between these 
two extremes. 
We also used an iterative approach to finding this 
model.  The regression model which immediately emerged was 
based on removing from the equation factor combinations 
with a p-value > 0.15.  Then the interactive process 
described above was applied in order to individually remove 
a term, observe the effect on the remaining p-values and 
2R , followed by removing another term until we had an 
acceptable model.  The final equation included only 
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squad/state/factors with p-values less than 0.10 of which 
there were 26.  The 2R  associated with this regression 
equation was 0.6078.  We were now ready to fit a final 
model including main effects, quadratics, and 2-way 
interactions. 
5. Fitting the Final Model 
Our final objective was to combine all three of the 
previous models to find the best equation which included 
main effects, 2nd degree polynomials, and 2-way 
interactions.  The process used was a backward stepwise 
regression.  We initially allowed the nine combinations, 
found to be significant in the main effects screening, into 
the equation.  Additionally, all of their squared terms and 
2-way interactions were entered.  We used backward step 
regression to screen out any variables whose p-value was 
greater than 0.05.  The author then individually removed 
and tested parameters with p-values greater than 0.01.  The 
difference between the 0.05 regression model and the 0.01 
model was not much in terms of the final 2R .  Prior to the 
individual screening 2R  was 0.6414, after screening it 
dropped by only 1 percentage point to 0.6310.  The Final 
model includes 20 terms; nine main effects, three quadratic 
effects, and eight 2-way interactions.  Having a complete 
equation we believed to be initially acceptable, we began 
checking our assumptions. 
6. Checking our Assumptions 
A generally accepted method of verifying the 
underlying assumptions of regression analysis is to view 
graphs output from the fitted model.  We used the actual 
number fed vs. the predicted number fed graph and the 
residuals vs. the predicted number fed graphs.  To get a 
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general idea of how well the prediction of the number fed 


























Figure 14.   Actual by Predicted Plot 
 
The actual number fed vs. the predicted number fed 
plot shows the general predictive capability of the model.  
In our case the slope is positive, indicating the 
prediction and actual amounts generally agree.  The plot 
also shows the average number fed (indicated by the dashed 
blue horizontal line) is just over 50. 
Another view of the same information is the residuals 
vs. predicted plot, Figure 15.  We were somewhat concerned 
when we first saw this plot that we might have violated one 
of our assumptions.  Namely, the residuals should be 
identically distributed with a mean of zero and constant 
variance.  The following plot shows a distinct pattern we 
would not expect if the residuals truly identically 























30 40 50 60 70
Mean(Alleg2Cas(Red)) Predicted
 
Figure 15.   Residual by Predicted Plot 
 
This shape usually indicates a trend in the data 
(perhaps due to an interaction) that has not been 
adequately modeled.  After careful consideration, we 
believed this pattern simply captured an aspect of our 
model setup that only became apparent in the residual plots 
because of the large range of factor levels we explored.  
The following example is used to explain what we thought 
was occurring. 
Because the setup of the simulation forces the 
southern neutrals to almost always receive food yet only 
encourages the northern neutrals to chase the convoy, a 
prediction of, say, 30 will most often be an under-
prediction of five.  Likewise, a prediction of 31, 32, or 
33 will also often be under-predictions of four, three, two 
respectively.  This accounts for the heavy line of points 
falling diagonally across the lower-left portion of the 
screen.  At the upper-right end we see the opposite effect 
of this same pattern.  A prediction over 70 must 
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necessarily be an over prediction because there are only 70 
neutrals in the model.  With this explanation in mind, if 
we turn the plot on the diagonal and then look to see if 
the points are evenly distributed, we see that they are. 
The first plot verified for us predictions were 
reflective of the actual number fed.  In the end the second 
plot confirmed consistent variance.  Taken together, we 
were satisfied the model met the necessary assumptions of 
multiple linear regression.  Our next objective was to look 
more carefully at some of the individual squad/state/factor 
combinations. 
7. Considering Individual Squad/State/Factors 
In order to get an idea of the impact individual 
variables had on the number fed and to identify the 
parameter settings having the most impact on mission 
success, we performed one-way analysis of variance tests.  
While we treated all nine significant combinations to this 
process, we present only the most dramatic examples of our 
findings here.  Throughout our modeling there were several 
parameters which repeatedly presented themselves as being 
significant and about which we never had any doubt as to 
their interpretation in the model.  We will now look more 
closely at these squad/state/factors.  We chose to examine 
these variables by performing the t-test and the Tukey 
comparison test over the range of their settings.  We 
wanted to determine in what range the factor combinations 
were significant.  This information would be useful for 
those preparing for an HA/DR mission. 
The following two figures, Figures 16 and 17, show 
means diamonds plots of the average number fed vs. the 
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northern neutral default sensor range.  The spread of the 
number fed shows up vertically at each setting of the 
independent variable.  The diamond indicates the 95% 
confidence region.  That is, the area where we predict with 
95% confidence that the true number fed lies.  The blue 
line connects the means of each diamond.  The red numbers 
(enclosed in the oval) and red circles indicate regions 
where there is no statistically significant difference 
between the settings. 
Notice the distinct bifurcation of the range.  From 
the beginning of our analysis we theorized the canalizing 
effect of the streets and buildings would play a part in 
the outcome of our experiment.  We cannot say for certain 
what the optimal sensor range should be but we can say 
there is a difference between ranges below 20 and those 
above 20.  These plots show sensor settings below 20 are 
not statistically significantly different.  They group 
together.  Factor settings of 20 or above are different 
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Figure 16.   One-way analysis of the number fed vs. northern 
neutral default sensor range.  Numbers in red are not 
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Figure 17.   One-way analysis of the number fed vs. northern 
neutral default sensor range.  Numbers in red are not 
significantly different from one another. 
 
The one-way analysis plot of northern neutral 
precision, Figure 18, shows very distinctly the trend in 
the number fed as a result of the deliberate movements of 
the neutrals.  This information may be useful when coupled 
with an understanding of the local population’s penchant 


























Figure 18.   One-way analysis of the number fed vs. northern 
neutral precision.  Less precise movement (higher 
settings) leads to fewer neutrals being fed. 
 
Because of our uncertainty regarding the threat rate 
parameter, we were interested to see what effect this 
factor had individually on the number of neutrals fed.  The 
threat rate plot, Figure 19, shows three groupings or a 
step-down effect.  Originally we thought a longer rate 
would result in more neutrals being fed and that seems to 
hold true at lower values of the parameter where the number 
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fed is above the mean.  As postings stay on the SA map for 
a longer time however, the number drops.  Our speculation 
regarding the effect of having too much information, or 
clutter on the SA map, may be true above a certain 
threshold.  In a dynamic urban environment, acting 
immediately on current information has a higher payoff than 


























Figure 19.   One-way analysis of the number fed vs. northern 
neutral threat rate.  The longer information stays 
available, the fewer neutrals are fed. 
 
Having identified interesting effects of individual 
factors we turned our attention to interactions between 
variables.  Based on what we had uncovered about factors 
that were important and what type of effects those 
parameters had on mission success we expected to identify 
nonlinearities in the way terms interacted. 
8. Considering Interactions 
We wanted to determine what effects the interactions 
were having on the number fed so we turned to contour plots 
as an exploratory tool.  These graphs plot two variables 
along the axes and depict the dependent variable as 
contoured regions within the body of the plot.  The 
contours reveal how the number of neutrals fed varies as 
the range of the two factors varies. 
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The first plot, Figure 20, shows the result of 
crossing the northern neutral’s default sensor range with 
convoy default movement speed.  It appears when sensor 
range is below about 30 it does not matter how fast the 
trucks travel.  In all cases, the fewest number of neutrals 
are fed at these settings.  A sensor range of 30 translates 
into about two city blocks in MANA.  As neutrals move 
around the scenario, most of the time they are either 
inside of buildings or moving between buildings.  We 
suspect, in order for contact to be made with the convoy 
before they miss the opportunity to gain initial contact, 
they must detect the convoy further off.  Otherwise their 
meeting with the convoy becomes merely chance.  This 
explanation may be useful when planning operations in the 
















































Figure 20.   Contour plot of northern neutral sensor range vs. 
convoy movement speed.  At sensor ranges below 30, 
convoy speed has no impact. 
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In Figure 21 northern neutral threat rate has been 
plotted against northern neutral default sensor range.  The 
graph generally reveals regions of high payoff when sensor 
range is set at higher values and areas of lesser effect 
when sensors are not as capable.  Threat rate seems to be 
dependent on the setting for sensor range though.  Only 
when threat rate is low and sensor range is high do we find 
good results.  Curiously, there is a trough (circled); an 
area where only 35 neutrals are fed.  This is most likely 
where only the southern neutrals are fed.  There seems to 
be some combination of these two factors where the northern 

















































Figure 21.   Contour plot of northern neutral sensor range vs. 
northern neutral threat rate.  Notice the trough; area 
where only 35 are fed. 
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Finally, we considered the interaction of northern 
neutral default sensor range and northern neutral 
precision, Figure 22.  What was interesting was the top 
left of the graph.  It looked like there was a large area 
of very high sensor range and very precise movement where 
over 60 neutrals were fed.  A very precise neutral would 
move in the most direct manner from where it was, to the 
northern HA site, whereas a less precise neutral may 
meander.  Since the convoy passes immediately by the HA 
site, we speculated a random path would not carry the 
neutral to the HA site in a timely manner.  That neutral 
may have missed the opportunity to make contact with the 
convoy.  A more precise neutral would have covered the 
distance to the HA site in less time and may have been in a 















































Figure 22.   Contour plot of northern neutral sensor range vs. 
northern neutral precision.  Notice the hole in the 




We close this section by summarizing a few points 
about our final model and then introduce the sub-models 
spawned by the preceding analysis.  Throughout this section 
we have justified the squad/state/factor combinations 
included in our regression model.  Additionally, we have 
interpreted the results of some of the findings.  Our 
methodology left us with no reservations regarding the 
terms in our final equation.  We have justified each of the 
main effects by qualitatively estimating their effect on 
the number fed.  In cases where the model disagreed with 
our intuition, we either found a plausible explanation for 
the effect of the factor combination or removed the term 
from consideration, even if that meant having a less 
explanatory equation.  Individual parameters were explored 
for their specific effect on the dependent variable.  
Lastly, contour plots were presented to show interesting 
interactions. 
The summary statistics of our final regression model 
appear next.  We stress what is important is identifying 
the factors and interactions themselves.  We would be 
hesitant to suggest an equation using the coefficients. 




Root Mean Square Error 6.7592
Mean of Response 50.392
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 640
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 20 48361.872 2418.09 52.9262 
Error 619 28280.910 45.69 Prob > F 




Term Estimate Std 
Error
t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept 62.8198 1.7451 36.00 <.0001
Convoy Default State Movement Speed -0.0257 0.0061 -4.22 <.0001
Security Default State Movement Speed -0.0337 0.0061 -5.54 <.0001
northern neutrals Threat Rate -0.0179 0.0018 -9.69 <.0001
northern neutrals Threat Size -0.0767 0.0096 -7.98 <.0001
northern neutrals Precision -0.0248 0.0018 -13.52 <.0001
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range 0.1815 0.0095 18.95 <.0001
northern neutrals Contact State Sensor Range 0.0743 0.0095 7.75 <.0001
Aggressor Precision) -0.0043 0.0018 -2.38 0.0177
Aggressor Default State SSKP -0.0353 0.0091 -3.86 0.0001
Convoy Default State Movement Speed * Security Default 
State Movement Speed 
-0.0005 0.0001 -4.03 <.0001
Convoy Default State Movement Speed * northern 
neutrals Threat Size 
0.0005 0.0002 2.54 0.0112
Convoy Default State Movement Speed * northern 
neutrals Default State Sensor Range 
0.0006 0.0002 2.90 0.0038
northern neutrals Threat Rate * northern neutrals Default 
State Sensor Range 
-0.0002 0.0000 -3.03 0.0026
northern neutrals Precision * northern neutrals Default 
State Sensor Range 
-0.0002 0.0000 -3.78 0.0002
northern neutrals Threat Rate * northern neutrals Contact 
State Sensor Range 
-0.0001 0.0000 -2.62 0.0091
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range * northern 
neutrals Contact State Sensor Range 
0.0012 0.0003 3.77 0.0002
northern neutrals Threat Size * Aggressor Precision -0.0001 0.0000 -2.83 0.0048
Convoy Default State Movement Speed * Convoy Default 
State Movement Speed 
0.0004 0.0001 2.60 0.0095
Security Default State Movement Speed * Security 
Default State Movement Speed 
0.0004 0.0001 2.71 0.0069
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range * northern 
neutrals Default State Sensor Range 
-0.0030 0.0003 -7.95 <.0001
Table 4.   Final Model including nine main effects, three 
quadratic terms, and eight 2-way interactions. 
 
After thoroughly fitting and examining the final 
linear regression model, we attempted to subdivide our 
parameter space in order to analyze two specific nuances of 
our scenario.  First, we considered a model fit around only 
those variables the Marines or their attachments could 
control.  Next, we fit what we called the Comms-and-Sensors 
model. 
C. OTHER REGRESSION MODELS 
The process of fitting the final model stirred our 
curiosity about several of the squad/state/factor 
combinations.  We wanted to explore what predictive power 
these combinations held in their own right. 
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1. The Marines-Only Model 
We were curious to know how much control the Marines 
could have over the number of people fed irrespective of 
the actions of the neutrals resident in the environment in 
which the Marines operated.  One way to get at this would 
be to try fitting a model consisting of only the factors 
the Marines and their attached relief agencies could 
prepare, control, or train for -- things such as convoy 
speed, unit cohesion, and hardening of the vehicles.  So we 
fit what we called the Marines-Only model by allowing into 
the equation only the factor combinations affecting the 
convoy or the security squad. 
This regression equation only explained 6% of the 
variability in the number of neutrals fed.  We were 
somewhat disappointed to find the convoy was not able to 
judge its success based solely on the factor combinations 
it could control or predict.  From the results, we 
concluded it would be very important to have some 
intelligence regarding the neutrals and the environment.  
It may be that the level of aggressiveness or cohesion of 
the populace plays a big role in how successful the convoy 
is.  This makes sense but does not give the responding 
relief agency much flexibility to operate in an uncertain 
environment.  Considering the importance of acquiring 
intelligence relating to the environment, we considered 
modeling the situation where the convoy broadcasts its 
intentions. 
2. The Marines-and-Sensors Model 
In this second Marines model, we considered the 
neutral sensor range as a surrogate for the effect of the 
convoy announcing ahead of time its convoy route.  We hoped 
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by including sensor range in our Marines-Only model we 
could improve our prediction of the number fed and still be 
true to what we were trying to model.  It seemed to us 
broadcasting the intentions of the convoy was somehow 
similar to exploiting the sensor range of the neutrals.  
The results were pleasing. 
 




Root Mean Square Error 8.7504
Mean of Response 50.3924
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 640
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio
Model 11 28557.047 2596.10 33.9050
Error 628 48085.735 76.57 Prob > F
C. Total 639 76642.783 <.0001
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept 48.5403 2.4917 19.48 <.0001
Convoy Default State Movement Speed -0.0227 0.0078 -2.90 0.0039
Convoy Squad Shot At State SA Threat 3 (High) 0.0523 0.0235 2.23 0.0264
Security Default State Movement Speed -0.0324 0.0078 -4.11 <.0001
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range 0.1791 0.0123 14.49 <.0001
northern neutrals Contact State Sensor Range 0.0823 0.0123 6.67 <.0001
Convoy Default State Movement Speed * Security 
Default State Movement Speed 
-0.0006 0.0001 -3.84 0.0001
Convoy Default State Movement Speed * northern 
neutrals Default State Sensor Range 
0.0005 0.0002 2.02 0.0439
Convoy Default State Movement Speed * northern 
neutrals Contact State Sensor Range 
-0.0005 0.0002 -1.94 0.0534
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range * 
northern neutrals Contact State Sensor Range 
0.0012 0.0004 2.97 0.0031
Security Default State Movement Speed * Security 
Default State Movement Speed 
0.0006 0.0001 3.38 0.0008
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range * 
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range 
-0.0028 0.0004 -5.86 <.0001
Table 5.   Marines-and-Sensors model. 
 
By simply including the sensor range factor the 
explained variability jumped to 37%.  With the importance 
of communications on the part of the northern neutrals 
emerging as a greater and greater predictor in determining 
the outcome, we fit a final regression equation focusing on 
all aspects of communications. 
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3. The Comms-and-Sensors model 
In order to fully explain the effect communications 
and sensors had on our scenario we focused our last 
regression model on fitting only these factor combinations.  
Throughout our analysis the efficiency of northern neutral 
communications continued to be highly significant.  By 
allowing into the equation only squad/state/factors having 
an effect on communicating and sensing we hoped to quantify 
this effect. 
We built this equation by initially allowing every 
squad’s threat rate, threat size, and sensor range into the 
model.  We would have preferred to include comms delay as 
well but the same uncertainty as addressed above prevented 
us from including this parameter.  The main effects, 
quadratics, and 2-way interactions were fit.  A p-value of 
0.10 was chosen as a cut-off point for initial inclusion in 
the regression equation and then the author manually 
removed factor combinations with p-values greater than 
0.01.  Initially we thought the results were disappointing.  
The model captured only about 45% of the variation. 
 




Root Mean Square Error 8.1910
Mean of Response 50.3924
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 640
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 7 34239.675 4891.38 72.9039 
Error 632 42403.108 67.09 Prob > F 
C. Total 639 76642.783 <.0001 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error T Ratio Prob>|t|
Intercept 48.8528 1.2987 37.62 <.0001
northern neutrals Threat Rate -0.0211 0.0022 -9.59 <.0001
northern neutrals Threat Size -0.0826 0.0115 -7.16 <.0001
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Term Estimate Std Error T Ratio Prob>|t|
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range 0.1849 0.0115 16.06 <.0001
northern neutrals Contact State Sensor Range 0.0717 0.0115 6.22 <.0001
northern neutrals Threat Rate * northern neutrals 
Default State Sensor Range 
-0.0002 0.0000 -3.44 0.0006
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range * 
northern neutrals Contact State Sensor Range 
0.0011 0.0004 2.79 0.0054
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range * 
northern neutrals Default State Sensor Range 
-0.0028 0.0004 -6.30 <.0001
Table 6.   Comms-and-Sensors model. 
 
A closer look revealed some surprises however.  First, 
we noted the Comms-and-Sensors model had only seven terms; 
four main effects, two interactions, and one quadratic 
effect.  Using only seven of our original 40 
squad/state/factor combinations we had explained 45% of the 
variation in this quite complex simulation.  Considering 
our simulation included 70 semi-autonomous agents, each 
responding independently to the environment around them, we 
considered this a helpful result.  The terms themselves 
bear consideration. 
Notice the parameters are all properties of the 
northern neutrals and notice further, a decision maker 
really only needs to know how to exploit the three main 
effects; threat rate, threat size, and sensor range.  This 
is a powerful finding.  It identifies where to focus 
intelligence assets and dramatically simplifies planning by 
suggesting ahead of time what type of tactical actions 
should even be considered.  For a commander with limited 
assets, he or she must decide where to concentrate those 
assets and one great place to start would be to exploit 
communications between the northern neutrals. 
In the final chapter we summarize the major findings.  
We reiterate significant insights and suggest further ways 
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these ideas may be applied to operational situations.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
According to the World Disasters Report 2001, 
over the last ten years an average of 211 million 
people (emphasis added) were affected by natural 
disasters each year… 
Global Humanitarian Emergencies: Trends and 
Projections, 2001-2002 
 
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
Throughout this research we have been guided by one 
overarching belief: the imperative for logisticians to 
research HA/DR operations.  The quote above can be taken as 
a premonition about what awaits the world in the coming 
year.  We believe the U.S. military will be sent to respond 
to crises around the world.  We also are convinced the 
success of HA/DR operations is highly dependent on 
transportation, distribution, medical support, and the many 
other components of logistics.  This research advances the 
understanding of HA/DR operations by boring into the 
underlying issues, developing a useful tool for exploring 
the problem, uncovering the important factors resulting in 
mission success in our logistics setup, and recommending 
areas of concentration for decision makers. 
The remainder of this chapter synopsizes the findings 
and recommendations of this research.  Before moving to 
those summaries, though, we are convinced of the following: 
• Logisticians must study HA/DR operations, paying 
attention to lessons learned and planning 
considerations. 
• There is great utility in using agent-based 
models as a means of exploring highly complex 
scenarios. 
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• Logistics functionality and measures of 
effectiveness must be included in agent-based 
models in order to fully exploit their benefits. 
• Coupling intelligent designs with the speed of 
data farming can increase the number of factors 
that can be explored by at least an order of 
magnitude. 
• Even though HA/DR operations are replete with 
variables, mission success may be dependent on 
only a handful of these variables. 
• Interactions between the few, highly important 
factors accounts for much of mission success. 
• When conducting logistics operations in an HA/DR 
environment, understanding and tapping into local 
communications is the key to mission success. 
• Marines should not predict the success of a 
mission solely on the variables they have control 
over. 
B. HA/DR OPERATIONS 
1. Conclusions 
The U.S. military faces the possibility of responding 
to two types of humanitarian or disaster scenarios.  First, 
they can be sent to an area affected by a natural disaster 
in order to provide immediate, interim life-saving and 
relief support.  They could also be called to a man-made 
disaster area, either arriving immediately at the onset or 
intervening at a crisis stage.  In either case, our forward 
deployed forces are trained and equipped to rapidly 
respond. 
The number of world-wide crises has increased since 
the end of the cold war.  This increase is tied to the rise 
in local and regional civil conflict, a trend which is 
expected to continue.  With 20 humanitarian crises 
currently ongoing in the world and an average of 255 
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natural disasters a year, we believe it is inevitable that 
U.S. forces will be directed to respond to a crisis in the 
near future. 
Logisticians will provide the bulk of the relief 
effort to future HA/DR operations.  Typically, traditional 
infantry objectives give way to relief functions during 
HA/DR operations.  With the infantry providing security, 
logisticians will be busy producing and transporting water, 
distributing food, building shelters, repairing roads, and 
providing medical relief.  The burden of responsibility for 
success will be on the logistics community and will depend 
on their planning, readiness, and execution. 
Appropriate measures of effectiveness must be applied 
specifically to the operation at hand in order to gauge the 
progress of the relief effort.  Choosing the correct MOE 
entails determining whether operational tasks or tactical 
efforts are being measured.  With this understanding, MOEs 
should be formed so they measure the effect the performance 
of a specific mission has on relieving the overall level of 
suffering. 
2. Recommendations 
Logisticians must study HA/DR planning and execution 
in order to prepare themselves for the inevitability of 
being called up for the next disaster.  They have a wide 
variety of resources available to aid their understanding.  
Between internet sites (see Appendix D for a list of 
informative sites), periodicals, annual reports, current 
books, and planning factor tables and calculators, 
logisticians should make good use of the lessons learned by 
others.  Furthermore, the overwhelming volume of literature 
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in support of HA/DR planning has to do with logistical 
tasks.  For example, the Sphere Project’s guide to minimum 
humanitarian standards [The Sphere Project, 2000] devotes 
200 pages to the details logistical planning. 
Logisticians must understand how to form and apply 
MOEs in an HA/DR environment.  Again, there is no need to 
reinvent the wheel.  There have been numerous studies 
undertaken to identify applicable MOEs.  Additionally, it 
is useful to review case studies of like operations and 
note the MOEs used in those crises.  Logisticians must 
learn to adapt the correct MOEs and ensure they are 
applying the MOEs appropriately to their operational 
echelon. 
C. AGENT-BASED MODELS 
1. Conclusions 
Agent-based models easily allow the researcher to 
develop and test a complex scenario.  By inculcating 
autonomous agents with simple desires and letting them 
individually make local decisions, an almost endless number 
of global outcomes are possible from a simple abstraction 
of a complex problem.  The speed with which these 
simulations can be created is of course, offset by the 
level of abstraction and this must be considered before 
accepting the validity of the effort.  We believe the 
ability to abstractly model complex human interactions is 
well worth what we may sacrifice in terms of the detail in 
the simulation. 
In order to be more useful in studying HA/DR 
operations, agent-based models must include the capability 
to explicitly measure the transfer and use of resources.  
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It is possible to concoct “workarounds” in many of the 
current agent-based environments but this is a poor 
substitute for the ability to directly measure supply 
levels.   
2 Recommendations 
Additional research should be carried out using agents 
to model logistics support to HA/DR operations.  Our study 
focused on food distribution but we can easily envision 
analyses being conducted on any of the following scenarios: 
• A study of various temporary housing options. 
• A study of the migrations of displaced persons. 
• A study of the spread of communicable diseases as 
a result of poor conditions brought on by a 
disaster. 
• A study of the change in health of persons 
affected by disaster. 
In addition, our model could be easily adapted to 
other situations.  One might analyze the effect of 
splitting up the convoy, adding more neutrals, or 
additional red agents.  Alternative feeding sites could be 
established or the convoy could stop at numerous sites.  
The terrain itself could be changed simply by altering the 
bitmap. 
In any case, we were gratified to see our research was 
partly responsible for instigating the addition of resource 
capabilities in the SOCRATES modeling environment.  We 
encourage MANA and PYTHAGORAS to add this functionality to 
their products as well.  We encourage analysts to begin 
exploring these capabilities.  We envision a suite of 
logistics models comparable to the set of urban models and 
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weapons effects models that currently exist for some of the 
software packages. 
D. DATA FARMING AND DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
1. Conclusions 
Data farming, coupled with an intelligent design of 
experiments, gives the researcher the ability to screen for 
relevant factors over a very large design space.  Complex 
problems, those including many variables and/or complex 
interactions, have the possibility of providing the 
greatest insights into HA/DR operations.  In order to 
correctly identify the factors that are important 
contributors to mission success, analysts need a tool which 
is not limited to looking at, for example, five factors at 
four levels and their interactions.  Our experiment 
considered 40 factor combinations at 640 different design 
points.  This degree of complexity was not reasonable to 
explore a few years ago.  To our knowledge, the highest 
number of factors and levels explored in an agent-based 
model up to this point has been 22 variables at 129 design 
points. 
In order to explore the impact of 40 
squad/state/factors simultaneously we needed to exploit 
supercomputing power and use an appropriate design of 
experiments.  Our LHC design ensured we sufficiently tested 
each parameter over the ranges we had selected.  PA was 
extremely helpful in farming our experiment over their 
supercomputing clusters.  Finally, we were able to quickly 
generate more data when we had misgivings about the models 
operation at particular parameter settings.  This proved to 
be a quick form of validation that would have been much 
more difficult without using supercomputing. 
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2. Recommendations 
We recommend the data farming procedure in cases where 
the researcher has a complex problem and wants to explore 
many factors at numerous settings.  We feel the 
supercomputing power of PA is not being exploited to its 
full potential.  This may be because interpreting a complex 
model is difficult.  Some researchers will opt for a 
simpler model that is more easily interpreted instead.  We 
encourage the PA community to explore more factors 
simultaneously.  They should design complex scenarios, 
“grow” their data in more dimensions, and use the power of 
the supercomputers to screen for relevant factors. 
A LHC design will go a long way toward assisting in 
the model setup for data farming.  LHC designs are 
intuitive, widely available, and easy to set up.  There are 
no restrictions on the number of factors in the designs.  
Furthermore, it is fairly simple to check for 
multicollinearity between columns prior to launching one’s 
experiment.  By appending several LHC designs, as we did, 
the analyst can quickly and easily construct a design with 
little multicollinearity.  This makes the interpretation of 
factor and interaction effects more straightforward.  We 
recommend researchers experiment with using LHCs to set the 
parameter levels in their designs. 
E. FITTING OUR MODEL AND MODEL RESULTS 
1. Conclusions 
Through fitting our various models, we uncovered five 
critical points.  First, we found the complex environment 
we had modeled could be effectively described by very few 
squad/state/factor combinations.  Secondly, those 
combinations having to do with local communications proved 
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to be vitally important.  Third, interactions between these 
parameters provided additional explanatory power.  Next, 
actions of the lone red agent had negligible impact.  
Finally, we found it was imperative for the relief agency 
to gather and use information from the local population.  
We now consider each point more closely. 
It was surprising to us that we could capture so much 
of the variability of our scenario (63%) with only the 20 
terms in our final model.  When we started fitting our 40 
main effects, we intended to eventually include quadratics 
and 2-way interactions.  The possible number of terms we 
could have begun with was 40 main effects, 40 quadratics, 
and 780 2-way interactions, for a total of 860 terms.  We 
believe we followed a rigorous screening process which 
stripped away those factors that truly did not have any 
significant explanatory power while at the same time 
prudently including only those which did.  More 
importantly, we are confident we have justified the 
variables we kept in the model.  We were able to interpret 
their effects in the scenario and believe we have tied 
their importance to decision making.  Finally, the factor 
combinations included provided meaningful insights from 
which we were able to draw important conclusions. 
In a system such as ours where we rely on the local 
population to react to our actions, we found communications 
between locals to be the driving factor determining mission 
success.  After viewing our results we believe the model 
did not turn out to be as open-ended as we had hoped.  For 
example, the neutrals had less autonomy then we had hoped 
and some of the parameters ended up either not measuring 
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what we had hoped or not even being relevant.  Furthermore, 
the movement algorithms and MOEs in MANA (number of 
red/blue killed) drove, to a certain degree, our model 
setup.  We would have preferred a less scripted setup.  
Nonetheless, the simulation we developed was a realistic 
scenario and in hindsight, the results agreed with our 
intuition.  If a relief agency were to find itself 
operating on urban terrain where there are line-of-sight 
and movement speed issues, the manner in which the word is 
passed becomes a critical component of distributing food. 
At this point it seems obvious that interactions 
between variables having to do with communications would be 
important to the outcome.  When we began, however, the way 
in which these factors interacted was not obvious.  For 
example, we reasoned both threat rate and sensor range 
would be important and have a positive correlation with the 
number fed.  After all, in the case of threat rate, the 
longer a sighting remained on the SA map, the more 
information available to northern neutrals pursuing the 
convoy.  Also, the farther away the northern neutrals could 
sense the convoy, the longer they would have to react.  As 
it turned out though, the coefficient on threat rate was 
negative.  When we then looked at the interaction between 
these factors, the coefficient was also negative owing to 
the negative threat rate coefficient.  We would not have 
predicted this at the outset. 
We fully expected the harassing fire of the aggressor 
to impact the number of people fed.  Since our red agent 
was modeled as timid, he would almost never fire and hit 
enough times to destroy a vehicle.  It turned out as long 
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as a truck was not destroyed; there was no correlation 
between the number fed and the harassing fire.  If the 
convoy employs a security element and sufficiently hardens 
vehicles, harassing fire is more of a nuisance then a 
predictor of mission success. 
Early on we proposed parsing our squad/state/factor 
combinations into two groups: those the convoy could 
control and all others.  For a time we hoped we could fit a 
model that would identify a group of variables the convoy 
had control over.  This would give them the flexibility to 
determine tactics that increase the chances of mission 
success based solely on their own actions.  We wanted to 
put their fate in their own hands.  It was informative, yet 
disappointing, when we were not able to fit an acceptable 
model.  In our simulation, the convoy must exploit local 
communication patterns to enjoy success. 
2. Recommendations 
Based on our results we have two general 
recommendations.  We reiterate our invitation for analysts 
to try fitting very large sample spaces.  Also, when 
operating in an urban HA/DR environment, the response the 
relief agency is trying to illicit from the local 
population must be considered.  We found even when we began 
by trying to measure virtually every interaction our 
screening technique quickly identified the heart of the 
problem.  We recommend researchers adopt this type of 
procedure to study highly complex scenarios.  We make a 
cautionary remark as well.  Agent-based simulations are 
highly abstracted and may require creative manipulation and 
interpretation of the parameters and MOEs when designing 
the simulation.  Researchers may find the simulation setup 
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leads to inadvertently stripping away too many factors when 
fitting the model.  The analyst must personally check 
factors not included in the regression model rather than 
simply relying on the software. 
With respect to what we have learned about HA/DR 
operations we found that responding agencies must identify 
whether their relief plan requires the local population to 
respond to some action they are taking.  If it does, that 
agency needs to consider how they will communicate to the 
locals what inhabitants are expected to do.  In our case, 
the northern neutrals need to recognize the convoy, 
understand the convoy would not stop at the northern HA 
site, and decide to follow the convoy to the southern site.  
To encourage these things to happen the convoy should 
broadcast its route plan and distribution scheme, and 
generally facilitate communications between locals. 
Before making our recommendation regarding convoy 
composition, we caution that this applies to the scenario 
we developed and may not apply in a different environment.  
Because our aggressor was relatively timid, that is, he 
only fired once and then ran away; the chances of impacting 
the success of the mission were very low.  We recommend 
that relieving agencies thoroughly understand the nature of 
the threat they face.  If that threat follows our pattern, 
a security element and lightly sandbagged vehicles are 
sufficient.  They need not employ assets such as armored 
vehicles to predict success. 
Finally, we recommend relieving agencies allocate 
intelligence assets to the task of deciphering local 
communications.  They must not rely solely on the 
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parameters they have control over.  Again, we invoke the 




APPENDIX A.  DISASTER STATISTICS 
A. PEOPLE AFFECTED BY DISASTER 
The following table, Table 7, relays the number of 
people affected by disaster over a 25 year period from 1972 
to 1996.  Furthermore, the table breaks these numbers down 
by the type of disaster.  Admittedly, the term affected is 
ambiguous.  The numbers come from the Department of Public 
Health, Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium) [CRED, 
2003], who has developed a series of databases for global 
disaster management.  We think our model is equally 
applicable to any of these situations and the reader is 





Famine Flood Wind Land-
slide 
Volcano Fire Total 
72-
76 
1,341,084 43,563,400 18,867,313 3,116,419 17,600 34,500 8,163 66,948,479 
77-
81 
614,626 52,122,671 31,609,232 8,199,291 1,802 28,400 44,933 92,620,955 
82-
86 
484,431 103,246,778 28,693,409 6,399,549 4,461 106,269 33,119 138,968,016 
87-
91 
5,071,710 75,851,888 119,779,115 22,664,204 630,750 156,740 73,693 224,228,100 
92-
96 
753,477 21,480,303 130,433,416 18,235,163 34,914 144,685 68,613 171,150,571 
Table 7.   Annual average number of people affected by 
type of disaster and by period (1972 to 1996).  
Source: CRED 
 
B. LIST OF HUMANITARIAN DISASTERS 
Table 8 is dated but relays the immenseness of the on-
going humanitarian situation within the world.  This 
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information comes from the Interdisciplinary Research 
Programme on the Root Causes of Human Rights Violations 
(PIOOM) [PIOOM, 2003], based at Leiden University in the 
Netherlands.  Each country listed is followed by a three 
letter code indicating the reason for the humanitarian 
crisis: Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), High Intensity 
Conflict (HIC), Violent Political Conflict (VPC), or (-), 
indicating that a crisis exists even though there is no 
current conflict.  Figures in the table represent a ranking 
on a scale of 1 to 5 of the degree of war, displacement, 
hunger, and disease prevalent in a country.  The following 
scale is used: 
 
• War – fatalities from violent and armed conflict, 
expressed in the number of people killed in 
political violence in 1997. 
1 = < 315 
2 = 316 – 999 
3 = 1,000 – 3,162 
4 = 3,163 – 10,000 
5 = > 10,000 
• Displacement – number of refugees and internally 
displaced people in 1997. 
1 = < 99,999 
2 = 100,000 – 316,199 
3 = 316,200 – 999,999 
4 = 1,000,000 – 3,161,999 
5 > 3,162,000 
• Hunger – calorie intake per capita, expressed in 
calorie supply as a percentage of requirements in 
1997. 
1 = 141 – 157 
2 = 124 – 140 
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3 = 107 – 123 
4 = 90 – 106 
5 = 72 – 89 
• Disease – expressed in terms of the under-five 
mortality rate per 1,000 live births in 1997. 
1 = 5 - 68 
2 = 69 – 131 
3 = 132 – 194 
4 = 195 – 257 
5 = 258 - 320 
 
 War Displacement Hunger Disease
Afghanistan (HIC) 5 5 5 4 
Burundi (HIC) 5 3 5 3 
Angola (LIC) 3 4 5 5 
Congo, DR of (HIC) 5 3 4 3 
Rwanda (HIC) 5 2 5 3 
Sudan (HIC) 4 5 5 2 
Sri-Lanka (HIC) 4 4 4 1 
Sierra Leone (LIC) 1 4 5 5 
Turkey (HIC) 4 4 2 1 
Algeria (HIC) 5 1 3 1 
Iraq (HIC) 3 4 2 2 
Mozambique (LIC) 1 2 5 5 
Liberia (HIC) 1 4 4 4 
Ethiopia (LIC) 2 1 5 4 
Somalia (LIC) 1 3 5 4 
India (HIC) 3 2 4 2 
Myanmar (HIC) 2 3 3 3 
Columbia (HIC) 3 3 4 1 
Congo PR of (HIC) 3 1 4 2 
Tajikistan (HIC) 3 2 2 2 
Eritrea (LIC) 1 3 4 4 
Zambia (VPC) 1 1 5 4 
Uganda (LIC) 2 1 4 3 
Cambodia (LIC) 2 1 4 3 
Armenia/Azerbaijan (LIC) 1 4 2 1 
Albania (HIC) 3 1 3 1 
Chad (LIC) 1 1 5 3 
Kenya (LIC) 1 2 5 2 
Madagascar (-) 1 1 4 3 
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 War Displacement Hunger Disease
Tanzania (-) 1 1 4 3 
Peru (LIC) 1 3 5 1 
Haiti (LIC) 1 1 5 2 
Bosnia/Herzegovina (LIC) 1 4 2 1 
Central African Rep (LIC) 2 1 5 3 
Chechnya (LIC) 1 3 2 1 
Viet Nam (VPC) 1 2 4 1 
Georgia (LIC) 1 3 2 1 
Guatemala (LIC) 1 2 4 1 
DPR Korea (VPC) 1 1 3 1 
Table 8.   Current official and de facto humanitarian 
emergencies.  Source: PIOOM 
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APPENDIX B.  MANA VARIABLES AND THEIR RANGE 
SETTINGS 
Following is a list of the parameters varied over, 
along with both the MANA User’s Manual description 
[Anderson et al., 2003] and the representation within the 
“real world.”  Justification follows for the factor ranges 
we selected as settings to the full model. 
A. THREAT PERSISTENCE 
• MANA Definition - The number of time steps that 
must pass for a threat on the Situational 
Awareness (SA) map to decay. 
• Real World Representation - As time passes 
information about enemy disposition and location 
becomes less and less reliable. 
• Ranges and Justification - The SA map is shared 
knowledge common to all agents of the same 
allegiance so if one agent knows the location of 
enemies, all agents of the same allegiance have 
the same awareness.  For this reason, threat 
persistence was not thought to have a significant 
impact on the outcome once an initial contact was 
made.  In order to test this hypothesis this 
factor was screened over values 1-500 for all 
units. 
B. THREAT INFLUENCE 
• MANA Definition - This is a circle around an 
agent.  An agent will respond to an enemy within 
this circle.  Threat influence allows agents to 
hold off a response to an enemy agent, even 
though they know the enemy’s location, until that 
enemy gets within a specified range. 
• Real World Representation - An individual or 
squad may defer action until the enemy is within 
effective weapons range. 
• Ranges and Justification - This setting has a 
significant effect on the way the neutrals 
respond to the convoy.  A larger ring around the 
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neutrals causes them to begin “chasing” the 
trucks earlier.  This factor was varied over many 
levels, 5-100 for the northern neutrals and the 
aggressor agent. 
C. FUEL TANK 
• MANA Definition - The amount of fuel the agent 
begins with. 
• Real World Representation - This variable can be 
used in conjunction with the fuel rate variable 
to model any commodity that would be expended as 
time passes or actions occur. 
• Ranges and Justification - The fuel tank feature 
was not used in this scenario.  The values were 
fixed and inconsequential. 
D. COMMS DELAY 
• MANA Definition - The number of time steps that 
will pass before enemy detections will appear on 
the SA map. 
• Real World Representation - There would naturally 
be an interlude of time before enemy detections 
are transmitted and posted to higher and adjacent 
units. 
• Ranges and Justification - Because there are 70 
neutrals, it was thought that a delay by one 
neutral in posting his sighting to the SA map 
would not have much impact on the outcome.  There 
will be a continuing stream of input to the map, 
one right after another, as successive neutrals 
make sightings.  Values from 0-500 were farmed 
for both neutral squads as a way to test this 
theory. 
E.  MOVEMENT PRECISION 
• MANA Definition - The degree of random motion 
when choosing a move is established through 
movement precision.  A small value makes movement 
more rigid, while a large value increases the 
randomness. 
• Real World Representation - There should be a 
difference between units that are executing a 
mission that calls upon them to follow a route 
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plan and units that are patrolling.  In the case 
of the first unit, one would expect their 
movement to be more direct from point A to point 
B.  The second unit may wander a bit more as they 
move. 
• Ranges and Justification - The convoy was given a 
small degree of randomness.  This setting was 
fixed over all of the runs.  Neutral movement 
precision was varied from 0-500; where 0 
represents no randomness and 500 indicates that ½ 
of their movements will be in a random direction 
while ½ will be toward their objective. 
F.  FIREPOWER 
• MANA Definition – This is the probability of 
killing an enemy with a single shot, the Single 
Shot Kill Probability (SSKP). 
• Real World Representation - SSKP represents the 
accuracy of the weapon and the proficiency of the 
shooter. 
• Ranges and Justification - The convoy will 
respond to any shot whether it is well aimed or 
not so we were interested to know how the model 
would react, even to shots that had no 
probability of a kill.  We varied red’s SSKP from 
0 to 100.  Blue’s SSKP was fixed at 20 for return 
fire and at 100 for purposes of feeding. 
G.  THREAT 
• MANA Definition - Threat is used as a means of 
differentiating between different types of 
threats.  The value is the threat level that will 
appear on the SA map of an opposing unit.  Threat 
level 1 corresponds to a low threat, level 2 a 
medium threat, and level 3 is a high threat. 
• Real World Representation - It is the case that 
neutrals appear less threatening than armed enemy 
combatants or tanks. 
• Ranges and Justification - The choice of a threat 
level is really arbitrary.  The response to a 
given threat level is determined by the weight 
given to the variable controlling movement toward 
or away from that threat level.  The convoy was 
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posted to the neutral’s SA map as a high threat 
(3).  Initially all neutrals were seen by the 
convoy as a low threat.  Once the convoy is fired 
upon they see the red agent as a high threat and 
respond accordingly. 
H.  STEALTH 
• MANA Definition - Stealth represents how 
difficult it is to see an entity once it is 
within an enemy’s sensor range. 
• Real World Representation - An enemy will use 
camouflage, cover, and concealment to hide his 
movements. 
• Ranges and Justification - The stealth parameter 
was not varied in the set of runs.  However, the 
red agent was set to favor stealth in his retreat 
path after he had taken a shot. 
I.  FUEL RATE 
• MANA Definition - This is the amount of fuel that 
is consumed per time step. 
• Real World Representation - The fuel rate could 
be used to model any resource that is consumed as 
time passes. 
• Ranges and Justification - Because of the short 
duration of the mission and the fact that the 
scenario is bounded by run length; the fuel rate 
variable was not used. 
J.  ALIVE FRIENDS 
• MANA Definition - These are weightings agents use 
to determine their next move, that is, a 
propensity to move toward or away from alive 
friends.  A higher weighting provides a greater 
attraction, whereas a lower number acts to 
repulse the agent from alive friends. 
• Real World Representation - This variable 
represents the cohesion a unit displays and can 
be used to force dispersion at one extreme and 
mobbing at the other extreme. 
• Ranges and Justification - Initial runs proved 
that this variable effected the movement of the 
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convoy and the clustering of neutrals.  In order 
to test the integrity of the convoy and the 
individuality of the neutrals we chose to vary 
the attraction of blue from 50-100 and that of 
neutrals from 0-50. 
K.  ALIVE ENEMIES 
• MANA Definition - Similar to the alive friends 
variable, this is the propensity to move toward 
or away from alive enemies. 
• Real World Representation - Depending on a unit’s 
mission, they may choose to close with an enemy 
or bypass an enemy. 
• Ranges and Justification - The convoy is directed 
to increase its speed and move away from an enemy 
threat.  This is accomplished by varying their 
levels between -100 and -50.  The same weighting 
is applied to the red agent in his retreat state.  
Conversely, red is attracted to the convoy with 
weightings between 50 and 100 in his default 
state.  The neutrals “chase” the convoy by 
varying their weights from 50-100 once they have 
made contact with the convoy. 
L.  INJURED FRIENDS 
• MANA Definition - The injured friends variable 
captures the propensity to move toward or away 
from injured friends. 
• Real World Representation - Each firefight is 
situationally dependent but it may be that a 
unit’s training for a given situation teaches 
them to rally around a downed comrade.  On the 
other hand, the same unit may be trained to 
quickly move out of a kill zone. 
• Ranges and Justification - Given that the convoy 
is directed to move away from an enemy agent, we 
were interested to see the results of runs made 
while they had competing orders to either rally 
around an injured squad member or away from an 





M.  DISTANT FRIENDS 
• MANA Definition - This variable controls the 
attraction/repulsion to friends that are far off. 
• Real World Representation - This may represent a 
way to reestablish contact with members of the 
squad that become separated. 
• Ranges and Justification - The distant friends 
parameter was not used in our scenario. 
N.  NEXT WAYPOINT 
• MANA Definition - The propensity to move toward 
or away from the next waypoint is established by 
the next waypoint variable. 
• Real World Representation - A patrol or convoy 
will almost always follow a predetermined route 
with checkpoints along the way. 
• Ranges and Justification - Initial runs 
determined that the convoy needed to have a 
strong weight in order to keep them from becoming 
“lost,” therefore convoy weights were permuted 
between 80-100.  The neutrals are given waypoints 
within the HA/DA sites, that is, they were 
attracted to the sites.  Their values were varied 
from 60-80. 
O.  ALTERNATE WAYPOINT 
• MANA Definition - An alternate waypoint can be 
triggered by a state change.  When this occurs, 
the alternate waypoint variable controls the 
attraction toward or away from that waypoint. 
• Real World Representation - This could be used to 
model an on-order mission. 
• Ranges and Justification - There were no 
alternate waypoints established in the model. 
P.  EASY TERRAIN 
• MANA Definition - An agent will seek to move 
toward or away from easy terrain when this 
variable is weighted. 
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• Real World Representation - Convoys will want to 
stay on roads, whereas persons are not restricted 
to the roads. 
• Ranges and Justification - The trucks were given 
a desire to stay on the roads.  After the red 
agent had taken a shot, his desire for easy 
terrain went up as he retreated. 
Q.  SA THREAT 1 (LOW), 2 (MED), 3 (HIGH) 
• MANA Definition - This variable controls the 
propensity of an agent to be attracted to or 
repulsed by a threat of level 1, 2, or 3 that 
appears on their SA map. 
• Real World Representation - Not every enemy 
threat is of equal importance or concern.  A tank 
may be seen as a greater threat than an 
infantryman. 
• Ranges and Justification - This variable is used 
to induce the northern neutrals to chase the 
convoy by setting their propensity from 50 to 
100.  Prior to contact, the aggressor agent will 
move toward the convoy (threat level 3) with 
parameter settings varying between 50 and 100.  
After contact is made between the red agent and 
the convoy, blue and red both want to move away 
from one another by setting values of threat 
level 3 from -100 to -50. 
R.  ALIVE NEUTRALS 
• MANA Definition - Similar to the alive friends or 
enemies variable, this is the propensity to move 
toward or away from alive neutrals. 
• Real World Representation - A unit may be given a 
mission that requires it to interact with the 
indigenous population. 
• Ranges and Justification - This variable did not 
come into play due to the fact that none of the 
agents were classified as neutrals. 
S. COVER 
• MANA Definition - The propensity of an agent to 
seek cover when moving is controlled by this 
parameter. 
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• Real World Representation - Patrol routes are 
usually planned in a way that maximizes use of 
natural cover. 
• Ranges and Justification - Red was given a slight 
desire to seek cover as he retreated. 
T.  CONCEALMENT 
• MANA Definition - Similar to cover, this is the 
propensity to seek concealment when moving. 
• Real World Representation - The same explanation 
as is given for cover. 
• Ranges and Justification - As with cover, red was 
given a slight inclination toward concealment 
when retreating. 
U.  SENSOR RANGE 
• MANA Definition - Although MANA has the option of 
either a cookie-cutter sensor or a user-defined 
sensor, we used the default cookie-cutter sensor.  
The sensor range is the number of cells away that 
an agent can see with 100% probability. 
• Real World Representation - Sensor range could be 
used to model any type of visual sensor. 
• Ranges and Justification - All agents were 
considered to be using their eyes as sensors.  
Since agents can not see through walls, values 
for the northern neutrals and the aggressor agent 
were permuted in the range 5-100 as a means of 
testing what affect the urban terrain had on the 
use of sensors. 
V.  FIRING RANGE 
• MANA Definition - An agent can shoot at another 
agent this many cells away. 
• Real World Representation - Every weapon has a 
maximum range. 
• Ranges and Justification - Due to the confining 
nature of urban terrain, we did not think that 
the maximum range of either direct fire or 
indirect fire weapons would be exceeded.  The 
levels were fixed throughout all runs. 
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W.  MAXIMUM TARGETS PER TIME STEP 
• MANA Definition - This is the number of targets 
that are within both sensor and firing range that 
can be engaged in a single time step.  MANA then 
divides this number by 100 allowing for less than 
one target per step or a fractional number of 
targets per step.  So a fraction such as 1.5 is 
interpreted as engaging one target per time step 
100% of the time and an additional target 50% of 
the time. 
• Real World Representation - Numbers greater than 
100 resemble weapons such as automatic weapons.  
Values less than 100 may be used to represent a 
bolt-action type of weapon. 
• Ranges and Justification - The red agent was 
allowed to engage between 1 and 3 targets per 
time step.  When the convoy reaches the HA/DR 
site its weapons become the means by which it 
delivers food.  Varying the levels between 80 and 
120 was seen a way to test the proficiency with 
which they delivered food. 
X.  MOVEMENT SPEED 
• MANA Definition - This is the number of grids an 
agent can move in one time step.  MANA then 
divides this number by 100 applying the same 
logic as given for the maximum targets per time 
step parameter. 
• Real World Representation - The real world 
application is direct.  It is worth noting 
however, that this movement algorithm induces 
hesitation and “jumps” in the way agents move 
which seems closer to reality than simply having 
constant movement rates. 
• Ranges and Justification - Based on operational 
experience, it was felt that the speed of the 
convoy should be 3 to 4 times the speed of the 
neutrals except for in certain, unique 
situations.  Convoy speeds varied from 50 to 200, 
while neutral speeds were constant except when 
chasing or retreating.  In these cases, they 
doubled their speed from 25 to 50. 
Y.  NUMBER OF HITS TO KILL 
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• MANA Definition - The number of hits an agent can 
sustain before it is killed. 
• Real World Representation - This variable is a 
way of modeling armor or “life force.” 
• Ranges and Justification - All neutrals could be 
killed with a single shot.  The number of hits to 
kill a truck within the convoy was changed 1-3. 
Z.  MINIMUM DISTANCE TO FRIENDS 
• MANA Definition - This parameter limits the 
distance to which friends will approach one 
another. 
• Real World Representation - Military units will 
try to keep dispersion as a means of passive 
security. 
• Ranges and Justification - In order to test the 
effect of various following distances, the convoy 
was subjected to permutations within the range 3-
15. 
AA.  MINIMUM DISTANCE TO ENEMIES 
• MANA Definition - This parameter limits the 
distance to which a unit will approach an enemy 
unit. 
• Real World Representation – The MANA factor 
mimics standoff range. 
• Ranges and Justification - Minimum distance to 
enemies was not used in the experiment. 
AB.  MINIMUM DISTANCE TO NEUTRALS 
• MANA Definition – This parameter is the same as 
the previous two only with respect to neutrals. 
• Real World Representation – It may be that a unit 
wants to keep away from the local population. 
• Ranges and Justification – Because the neutral 
and red agents were given the same allegiance, 
they were classified as enemies for modeling 




AC.  MINIMUM DISTANCE TO NEXT WAYPOINT 
• MANA Definition - The variable ensures that an 
agent does not go closer to the next waypoint 
than a specified distance. 
• Real World Representation - A unit may want to 
keep its distance from a point. 
• Ranges and Justification - This variable was not 
invoked in this model. 
AD.  CLUSTER CONSTRAINT 
• MANA Definition – Cluster constraint prevents the 
buildup of clusters of friendly entities above a 
specified size. 
• Real World Representation – In order to provide 
an extra measure of security, we may want to 
keeps our forces dispersed. 
• Ranges and Justification – We did not use the 
cluster constraints in our model.  Although we 
would want to maintain separation between 
vehicles in a convoy, we thought that this would 
be hard to do in a stop-and-go, urban 
environment.  We thought the neutrals would tend 
to cluster. 
AE.  COMBAT CONSTRAINT 
• MANA Definition – This parameter prevents a squad 
from advancing on an enemy without a numerical 
advantage. 
• Real World Representation – We normally want to 
attack with a three to one advantage. 
• Ranges and Justification – Since our scenario 
modeled chance meetings between the convoy and 
the red agent we did not invoke this factor 
setting. 
AF.  ADVANCE CONSTRAINT 
• MANA Definition – Similar to the other two 
constraints, this setting indicates the number of 
friendly agents that must be grouped together 
before the squad will advance toward its next 
waypoint. 
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• Real World Representation – If a combat team gets 
ambushed they may want to abort their mission 
unless they are at least a certain percentage 
effective. 
• Ranges and Justification – We considered using 
this setting to nullify a mission if a member of 
the convoy became separated but by doing that we 
would have introduced other complications to 
modeling that were not easily overcome. 
AG.  REFUEL TRIGGER RANGE 
• MANA Definition – This is the maximum distance an 
entity can be from the squad to be able to be 
refueled by that squad. 
• Real World Representation – In order to pass any 
commodity, the parties would need to be in 
contact. 
• Ranges and Justification – We did not pass any 
resources between agents so this parameter was 
not used. 
AH.  PROBABILITY OF REFUEL ENEMY/FRIEND/NEUTRAL 
• MANA Definition – The probability that an 
enemy/friend/neutral within the refuel trigger 
range will be refueled. 
• Real World Representation – This parameter can be 
used to model the instance where someone is 
passing out literature to people who don’t 
necessarily want it. 
• Ranges and Justification – Again we did not pass 
any resources. 
AI. SHOT RADIUS 
• MANA Definition – This is the kill radius for the 
standard personal weapon.  All entities within 
the radius have the same SSKP. 
• Real World Representation – Shot radius can be 
used to model direct fire or area fire weapons 
effect radius. 
• Ranges and Justification – We varied the 
aggressor’s shot radius between 1 and 30 to 
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indicate either a direct fire weapon or an area 
fire weapon such as a rocket propelled grenade. 
AJ.  ARMOR THICKNESS 
• MANA Definition – The thickness (in mm) of armor 
as it relates to additional user defined weapons. 
• Real World Representation – Represents the 
thickness of either body armor or vehicle skin. 
• Ranges and Justification – Since we did not 
introduce any additional weapons into the model, 
we did not use this parameter.  We did try to get 
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APPENDIX C.  JAVA CODE USED IN THIS THESIS 
A.  FACTOR.JAVA CLASS 
The Factor class is a utility class that stores and 
retrieves factor information.  This class creates instances 
of Factor with a low and high level. 
/* 
 * Factor.java 






 * Utility object to store and retrieve factor information. 
 * @author  paul & susan sanchez 
 */ 
public class Factor { 
    private String name; 
    private double lowLevel; 
    private double highLevel; 
    private int numberOfLevels; 
     
    /** Creates a new instance of Factor.  Low level must be less 
than high level.  Otherwise, high level is set to low level + 1.  
     * @param n name of factor. 
     * @param l low level of factor. 
     * @param h high level of factor.  
     */ 
    public Factor(String n, double l, double h) { 
        name = n; 
        if (l < h) { 
            lowLevel = l; 
            highLevel = h; 
        } 
        else { 
            lowLevel = l; 
            highLevel = l + 1; 
        } 
    } 
     
    /**  
     * Creates new instance of Factor with low level set to 
negative infinity and high level set to positive infinity. 
     * @param n name of factor. 
     */ 
    public Factor(String n) { 
        this (n, Double.NEGATIVE_INFINITY, 
Double.POSITIVE_INFINITY); 
    } 
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    /* 
    public void setName(String n) { 
        name = n; 
    } 
    */ 
     
    /** 
     * Retrieve the factor's name. 
     * @return the factor's name. 
     */ 
    public String getName() { 
        return name; 
    } 
     
    /** 
     * Set the low level for the factor. 
     * If the specified value is greater than or equal to the 
high level, the request is ignored. 
     * @param x desired low level. 
     */ 
    public void setLowLevel(double x) { 
        if ( x < highLevel) { 
            lowLevel = x; 
        } 
    } 
     
    /** 
     * Retrieve the low level for the factor. 
     * @return the low level for the factor. 
     */ 
    public double getLowLevel() { 
        return lowLevel; 
    } 
     
    /** 
     * Set the high level for the factor.  If the specified value 
is less than or equal to the low level, the request is ignored. 
     * @param x desired high level. 
     */ 
    public void setHighLevel(double x) { 
        if ( x > lowLevel) { 
            highLevel = x; 
        } 
    } 
  
    /** 
     * Retrieve the high level for the factor. 
     * @return the high level for the factor. 
     */ 
    public double getHighLevel() { 
        return highLevel; 
    } 
  
    /* 
    public void setNumberOfLevels(int n) { 
        if ( n > 1) { 
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            numberOfLevels = n; 
        } 
    } 
  
    public int getNumberOfLevels() { 
        return numberOfLevels; 
    } 
    */ 
} 
 
B.  READFACTORS.JAVA CLASS 
This class reads in the factors and the range of each 
factor.  ReadFactors then calls the LatinHyperCube class to 
actually churn out the design. 
/* 
 * ReadFactors.java 






 * This class reads a set of factors with low and high integer 
levels from stdin.  The input must be in the form one value per line.  
Its output is a number of independent Latin hypercubes with integer 
factor levels spaced (nearly) symmetrically between the low and high 
levels.   
 * @author  paul sanchez & susan sanchez 
 */ 
public class ReadFactors { 
     
    /** 
     * @param args optional argument specifies the number of 
replications.  Default is one replication if no command line argument 
is given. 
     */ 
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        String name; 
        double l; 
        double h; 
        LatinHypercube lh = new LatinHypercube(); 
         
        BufferedReader d = new BufferedReader(new 
InputStreamReader(System.in)); 
        try { 
            for (;;) { 
                name = d.readLine(); 
                l = Double.parseDouble( d.readLine() ); 
                h = Double.parseDouble( d.readLine() ); 
                lh.addFactor(name, l, h); 
            } 
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        } 
        catch (Exception e) { 
        } 
         
        int nreps = 1; 
        if (args.length > 0) { 
            nreps = Integer.parseInt(args[0]); 
        } 
        for (int n = 0; n < nreps; ++n) { 
            int[][] levels = lh.generateIntegerLHDesign(); 
            if (n == 0) { 
                for (int j = 0; j < levels[0].length; ++j) { 
                    System.out.print(lh.getFactorName(j)+"\t"); 
                } 
                System.out.println(); 
            } 
            for (int i = 0; i < levels.length; ++i) { 
                for (int j = 0; j < levels[i].length; ++j) { 
                    System.out.print(levels[i][j]+"\t"); 
                } 
                System.out.println(); 
            } 
        } 
         
    } 
     
} 
 
C.  LATINHYPERCUBE.JAVA CLASS 
The LatinHypercube class fills out the LHC by 
generating the factor levels derived from the Factor class, 
and then shuffling those generated levels. 
/* 
 * LatinHypercube.java 








 * Provides the ability to generate square Latin hypercube 
designs. 
 * @author  paul & susan sanchez 
 */ 
public class LatinHypercube { 
    private Vector factorSet; 
    private Random r; 
     
    /** Creates a new instance of LatinHypercube */ 
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    public LatinHypercube() { 
        factorSet = new Vector(); 
        r = new Random(); 
    } 
     
    /**  
     * Adds another factor to the set of those to be studied. 
     */ 
    public void addFactor(String n, double l, double h) { 
        factorSet.add(new Factor(n, l, h)); 
    } 
     
    /** 
     * Generate a design with integer-valued factor levels.  
First generates the levels based on the user-specified ranges and the 
number of factors in the set to be studied.  The design is created by 
shuffling the generated levels, one factor at a time, into a random 
order. 
     * @param none 
     * @return a two-dimensional array of integers containing the 
     *    design.  Rows correspond to runs, columns to factors.  
     */ 
    public int [][] generateIntegerLHDesign() { 
        int n = factorSet.size(); 
        int [][] design = new int[n][n]; 
        for (int j = 0; j < n; ++j) { 
            Factor f = (Factor) factorSet.elementAt(j); 
            int numberIntegerLevels = (int) (1 + f.getHighLevel() 
- f.getLowLevel()); 
            for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) { 
                design[i][j] = (int) (Math.rint(f.getLowLevel() + 
i * ( numberIntegerLevels - 1.0)/( n - 1)) ); 
            } 
        } 
        shuffle(design); 
        return design; 
    } 
     
    /** 
     * Get the factor name for the specified factor. 
     * @param f the index of the desired factor. 
     * @return the name of the specified factor. 
     */ 
    public String getFactorName(int f) { 
        return ((Factor) factorSet.elementAt(f)).getName(); 
    } 
     
    /* 
     * Private method to shuffle the raw levels, one factor at a 
time. 
     */ 
    private void shuffle(int[][] design) { 
        for (int j = 0; j < design.length; ++j) { 
            for (int i = 0; i < design[j].length; ++i) { 
                int swapIndex = r.nextInt(design[j].length); 
                int tmp = design[i][j]; 
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                design[i][j] = design[swapIndex][j]; 
                design[swapIndex][j] = tmp; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
     
    /** 
     * Illustrates how to create, add factors, and generate from 
a LatinHypercube object.  For testing purposes only. 
     * @param args ignored 
     */ 
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        LatinHypercube lh = new LatinHypercube(); 
        lh.addFactor("Factor1", 10, 12); 
        lh.addFactor("Factor2", 10, 11); 
        lh.addFactor("Factor3", 1, 17); 
        lh.addFactor("Factor4", 10, 50); 
        lh.addFactor("Factor5", 1, 5); 
         
        int[][] levels = lh.generateIntegerLHDesign(); 
         
        for (int j = 0; j < levels[0].length; ++j) { 
            System.out.print(lh.getFactorName(j)+"\t"); 
        } 
        System.out.println(); 
         
        for (int i = 0; i < levels.length; ++i) { 
            for (int j = 0; j < levels[i].length; ++j) { 
                System.out.print(levels[i][j]+"\t"); 
            } 
            System.out.println(); 
        } 
    } 
} 
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APPENDIX D.  HA/DR WEBSITES 
 
The following table is a short list of several of the 
key agencies involved in humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief operations.  This list is not meant to be 
exhaustive.  Most of the websites listed have links to 
other organizations, which may specialize in specific 
nuances of HA/DR operations.  Many agencies have posted 
tools such as weather updates, online journals or tables, 
supply calculation and tracking systems, financial tracking 
system, and training seminars on their websites as well. 
 
Center of Excellence in Disaster 
Management and Humanitarian 
Assistance 
www.coe-dmha.org 
Relief Web www.reliefweb.int 
U.S. AID www.usaid.gov 
Center for Disaster Management and 
Humanitarian Assistance 
www.cdmha.org 
Oxfam America www.oxfamamerica.org 
World Vision www.worldvision.org 
Pan American Health Organization www.paho.org 
World Health Organization www.who.int/disasters 
Disaster Relief www.disasterrelief.org




Doctors Without Borders www.msf.org 
UNICEF www.unicef.org 
Federal Emergency Management Agency www.fema.gov 
U.S. Department of State www.state.gov 
Christian Children’s Fund www.ccfusa.org 
Table 9.   List of informative humanitarian assistance and 
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